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Business accountability for climate change: carbon emissions contributions and future sectoral 
pathways for global carbon budgets 
Maida Hadziosmanovic 
Discussions regarding climate change accountability, and accordingly, the effort-sharing of 
climate change mitigation, have focused predominantly on the role of nation-states as the most 
relevant actors. Yet, companies that are contributing greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere 
have not similarly been held accountable, nor have they been given clear mitigation guidelines 
that follow global climate targets. In this study, I aim to encourage business accountability by 
highlighting the emissions contributions of public companies and the need for reliable corporate 
reporting and mitigation efforts. I evaluate reported company emissions in 2015, and allocate 
sectoral carbon emissions budgets associated with the climate targets of remaining below a 
global mean temperature increase of 1.5°C, and 2°C. I then provide linear, exponential, and 
logistic functions as future sectoral emissions pathways that conform to these budgets. I also 
evaluate corporate reporting patterns in the context of company market value and location. 
Results show that only 7% of companies worldwide report direct emissions. These companies 
account for a fifth of global CO2 emissions in 2015. Pathways constrained to the 1.5°C budget 
especially suggest that early and stringent mitigation is critical. Companies may favour the 
logistic pathway which accommodates an initial lag in emissions reductions, though it forecasts 
rigorous mitigation requirements in the near future. Weak but significant positive correlations 
between company market capitalization and emissions may indicate that larger companies are 
more likely to report greater emissions, and that market value may have potential to be used as a 
proxy for estimating company emissions. Sectoral level analyses would be improved if corporate 
emissions disclosure was widespread and verified for reliability. Achieving global climate goals 
requires accountability that goes beyond the nation-state boundary and that reaches businesses. 
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Accounting: In the context of ‘carbon’ or ‘emissions’ accounting: the methodology used to 
calculate greenhouse gas emissions.  
Business: An entity in the practice of making, buying, or selling of goods and/or services. It can 
be used on its own or as a descriptor. It is also used in its abstract sense, as it relates to the realm 
of business.  
Company: An entity formed to practice a business. May be used interchangeably with business.  
Corporation: Carries a legal and formal meaning; it is a business that legally exists separately 
from its owners, and thus has its own distinct rights, privileges, and liabilities. Other theoretical 
applications of the term ‘corporation,’ namely its application to state governments, remains 
outside of the scope of this research.  
Corporate: An adjective (as it relates to a corporation, but is not limited to a corporation) used 
to describe business activity, whether specific to an individual business, or more generally, the 
realm of business.  
Country of domicile: The country location of a company’s senior management (Bloomberg L.P. 
2016). 
Disclosure: Communication or reporting of environmental information, namely greenhouse gas 
emissions (with the assumption that the information becomes available to the public). The terms 
to ‘disclose’ or ‘report’ may be used interchangeably.   
Market capitalization: The worth of a company calculated by multiplying the shares 








1.1 Climate change and relevant actors 
The notion of responsibility for climate change and the effort-sharing of climate change 
mitigation has become pervasive in climate science and policy discussions. The working order 
and context in which the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
was adopted, as well as the reoccurrence of international state-led meetings such as the 
Conference of the Parties (COP), presumes nations to be principal actors in contributing to 
climate change. Though there is some merit to studying the responsibility or accountability of 
nations, there are other equally important actors that contribute substantial amounts of emissions 
to our atmosphere; namely, businesses. Businesses play a dual role in climate politics: they are 
principal players in the production of GHG emissions, but also carry the greatest potential for 
reducing future emissions through informed operational and financial decisions. On that account, 
interpretations of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (UNFCCC 1992), introduced by 
the Parties to the UNFCCC can and should extend to non-nation state actors. 
1.1.1 Dimensions of blame for climate change: contributions, responsibility, and 
accountability 
Before exploring the roles of business in climate change, it is important to identify and define 
different types of blame associated with these roles. Contributions, responsibility, and 
accountability, in the context of climate change must be differentiated when discussing climate 
change mitigation, as they are too often conflated. I adopt the definition of a ‘contribution’ in 
part from Müller et al (2009), who described it as a causal act, which in the context of climate 
change I understand to be the physical act of emitting GHGs to the atmosphere. Responsibility, 
on the other hand, is a concept of blame which carries more ambiguity. Aristotle considered 
moral responsibility as a blame assigned to agents carrying out voluntary actions, rather than 
involuntary ones (Ross 1954), while Müller et al (2009) suggested that it can also be assigned 
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where action is involuntary and results in harmful effects1. Although science provides robust 
evidence of the harmful effects of climate change at grand scales (IPCC 2014a), it is nearly 
impossible to trace a single act of emitting GHGs to a specific event (Huber and Gulledge 
2011). Accountability, on the other hand, is a type of blame which is action-oriented, or as 
Mulgan (2003) described it, must lead to some sort of rectification. In the context of climate 
change, examples of accountability could be emissions mitigation, or payments for adaptation. It 
is essential that accountability as a form of blame be accepted as it is the type of blame which 
incites climate change mitigation efforts. Yet, it carries elements from both the concepts of 
contribution and responsibility, and so it cannot easily succeed on its own.  
1.1.2 Three conditions for establishing business accountability for climate change 
Holding companies or more generally, the business world, accountable for their contributions to 
climate change in the form of GHGs emissions, is a difficult task. Legal authorities, both at the 
international and national levels, have yet to step in and enable accountability. So, in the general 
absence of legal authority, and with the climate change clock ticking, we must look towards 
other forms of non-government initiatives, namely those coming from companies and their 
stakeholders.  
It follows that there are certain conditions necessary for these initiatives to take place. The first 
condition to establishing accountability is that companies recognize their roles as contributors to 
climate change, and so accept a degree of responsibility for the physical phenomena of climate 
change itself. (The obvious precursor being that climate change denial be relinquished). 
Companies’ accommodating behaviours to the pressures of climate change since the 2000’s 
(Jones and Levy 2007) may be evidence to support that companies are beginning to recognize 
their roles in contributing to climate change. Nevertheless, it is possible that these behaviours are 
simply pre-emptive to economic, competitive, or other pressures that climate change poses to 
business activity (Jones and Levy 2007). Openly acknowledging their roles as climate change 
contributors adds potential to establishing accountability, though it is not a pre-requisite for the 
 
1 Further discussion of the ambiguity and implications of assigning responsibility is continued in section 2.1: 
Exploring accountability. 
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next condition.  
The next (second) condition for accountability is a commitment to transparency. One of the 
reasons why businesses have not been pressed to act on climate change is because there is no 
single agreed upon framework for the disclosure of environmental information. Furthermore, 
many national governments are either lax in regulation, or do not have regulation in place at all. 
But in recent years, an emerging corporate responsibility infrastructure has put pressure on 
companies to report more environmental information (Waddock 2008). As part of this 
infrastructure, there exist an abundance of emissions accounting methodologies and disclosure 
routes, although they are not necessarily streamlined with each other (Waddock 2008). 
Companies are nevertheless increasingly participating in the publishing of environmental 
information related to their business activities, sometimes in the form of sustainability reports, or 
submitted directly to disclosure programs. Despite this development, participation is not 
universal and accounting and reporting methodologies must be improved for consistency, 
reliability, and comparability. Without common and consistent emissions accounting methods, 
there is no point of comparison available for measuring efforts or improvements, and emissions 
mitigation becomes disincentivized. We should thus not anticipate that businesses will commit to 
long-term mitigation efforts in the absence of proper emissions accounting.  
The third condition for accountability is an acceptance of the duty to take on emissions 
mitigation efforts. Beyond claiming support for climate change action, and beyond even accurate 
accounting and effective disclosure methods, GHG emissions must ultimately be reduced. It is 
important to note, as well, that disclosure does not necessitate mitigation (Sullivan 2009), but it 
does make it easier to achieve. Large, profit-making businesses are not restrained by lack of 
resources, expertise, technology, nor truthfully, capital, in order to take part in effectuating 
emissions reductions. In addition to patchy reporting frameworks, it is also due to the little 
guidance available on setting appropriate emissions targets in line with greater global climate 
goals, that companies are not engaging in mitigation action. The question that follows is, how 
might mitigation efforts in accordance with climate goals be distributed among businesses? 
Without an attempt at equitable allocation, actors are less likely to participate in climate action 
and reducing GHG emissions.  
It is only once these three conditions - recognizing contributions, being transparent, and 
accepting the duty of mitigation - are assumed, that we might anticipate successful mitigation 
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efforts. Yet, even when we recognize the paramount roles played by businesses, the question that 
remains is, how do we identify accountable actors, and subsequently distribute the efforts of 
mitigation? And how should these tasks be differentiated? It is evident that the earth’s 
atmosphere as a commons only responds to GHG emissions reductions, and does not concern 
itself with who does it, or where or how it happens. That being so, it is essential to hold 
contributors to climate change accountable, by expecting not only transparency, but effective and 
timely mitigation efforts from them. 
Until now, business accountability has remained largely on the periphery of scholarly 
discussions on anthropogenic climate change, as academic research has focused predominantly 
on the role of nation states as principal actors in contributing to climate change. So as to help 
facilitate business accountability, businesses, stakeholders, and policy-makers would benefit 
from more complete academic studies on the role of business in contributing to climate change. 
This includes further exploration of available emissions data provided by these businesses, as 
well as investigation into appropriate business emissions targets that are in line with global 
climate goals. It is important to acknowledge the potential of disclosed corporate emissions data 
in being informative and insightful, despite some of the uncertainty surrounding the accounting 
and reporting frameworks by and through which the data is provided. There is a need to 
synthesize this data, so as to understand both the extent of participation in reporting, and the 
quantity of GHG emissions being disclosed by these companies. Furthermore, other factors 
potentially influencing reported corporate emissions, such as company location and size, should 
also be considered relevant to this area of research. 
1.2 Research goals and thesis structure 
The main intent of this thesis is to address the importance of business accountability for climate 
change by:  
1. Presenting emissions contributions from businesses sourced from voluntarily disclosed 
data; 
2. Identifying patterns of reporting and factors influencing emissions disclosure; and 
3. Providing guidance for creating business emissions reduction goals that are in line with 
the global climate targets of remaining below a 1.5°C and 2°C rise in global average 
temperature.  
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I provide a review of the literature in Chapter 2, which entails previous efforts at understanding 
and establishing climate change responsibilities, allocating future emissions shares, and 
corporate activities and responses to climate change.  
In Chapter 3, I present the main analyses on emissions reporting, sectoral carbon budgets and 
future sectoral emissions pathways. Here, I provide my methodology, results, and discussion on 
the implications and limitations of the carbon budgets and emissions pathways. Chapter 3 is also 
supported with a short introduction and literature review.   
I provide additional results in Chapter 4, examining the impact of company size and location as 
factors that may impact corporate emissions disclosure. 
I conclude with Chapter 5, which reviews the research goals and implications of the results, 






2.1 Exploring accountability 
The question of who is accountable for climate change, and correspondingly, which agents 
should carry the effort of GHG emissions reductions, has been examined extensively. In this 
literature review I will summarize and evaluate the approaches that have been used to address the 
question of accountability, as well as identify which methods could further studied and justified.  
Science has demonstrated, beyond a doubt, that current climate change is anthropogenic, and 
requires immediate and stringent GHG emissions mitigation action in order to avoid dangerous 
global repercussions (IPCC 2014b). Unfortunately, what science has not yet successfully 
produced, is a suitable method by which emissions mitigation should occur. This is in part due to 
differing perspectives and understandings of accountability; a topic which many authors have 
attempted to make sense of (Jamieson 2009, Müller et al 2009, Markowitz et al 2015).  
First and foremost, accountability must be delineated as distinct from the concepts of 
responsibility for climate change, and contributions to climate change2. It is easy to conflate 
these concepts and employ them interchangeably, but I contend that they have important 
differences. A contribution may be viewed as a causal act (Müller et al 2009). In the context of 
climate change, it thus refers to the emission of GHGs. Thereby, anyone emitting GHGs is 
contributing to the resulting climate warming. Being responsible for climate change in the moral 
sense, however, is much more ambiguous. Müller et al (2009) well illustrated some issues of 
imparting responsibility in stating that, “It is one thing to say that this and that series of 
emissions have contributed a certain percentage to the increase in global mean temperature…, 
and quite another to say that the United States of America has done so.” While causal 
contributions of emissions from sovereign territory may be scientifically precise, moral 
responsibility is not so easily imparted. Responsibility, as judged by Aristotle (Ross 1954) is 
 
2 Where ‘responsibility’ encompasses ‘being responsible’, and ‘accountability’ encompasses ‘being accountable’ or 
‘being held accountable’, but is different from the ‘accounting’ (calculating) of GHG emissions.  
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blame assigned to agents carrying out voluntary actions, rather than involuntary ones. On the 
other hand, Müller et al (2009) suggested that blame can also be assigned where action is 
involuntary, specifically where it results in harmful effects.  
If we are to accept only Aristotle’s definition of responsibility, in the context of climate change, 
this implies that every agent emitting GHGs voluntarily is morally responsible. Yet, it is 
challenging to determine the voluntary or involuntary nature of emitting GHGs, as this act is a 
physical phenomenon that requires some conscious human action (assuming that we are 
excluding non-human induced emissions from this discourse). Consequently, it could be argued 
that all emissions of GHGs are voluntary, in which case everyone emitting GHGs is found to be 
responsible. Yet if everyone is found to be responsible, then no one is responsible. 
If we extend the definition to that given by Müller et al (2009), and if we are also able to identify 
involuntary emissions, then we would require proof of the resulting 'harmful effects'. Although 
GHGs emitted to the atmosphere, whether voluntary or involuntary, have harmful effects on the 
environment (i.e. the overall effect being anthropogenic climate change), it is extremely difficult 
to trace a single actor’s emissions to a specific climate change impact. This also contributes to 
the ambiguity associated with responsibility.  
Finally, an important distinction is the fact that simply carrying responsibility does not 
necessarily incite mitigation action, whereas, accountability does. Being accountable, or being 
held accountable goes beyond transparency, and must lead to some sort of rectification (Mulgan 
2003). In this thesis my interpretation, therefore, is that in holding an actor accountable for their 
contributions to climate change, we anticipate mitigation action from them. 
It is beyond the scope of this science based study to provide in-depth ethical or normative 
arguments to establish why businesses, in contributing to climate change, should also be morally 
responsible, and thus held accountable for climate change. Instead, to simplify and expedite the 
way towards climate change mitigation action, I allocate business emissions budgets in an effort 
to bring the viability and the importance of corporate action to the attention of climate mitigation 
discussions. Furthermore, I hope that this work helps render trivial any arguments which 
undermine the contributing role of business in climate change.   
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2.1.1 Nations 
Recent literature on the topic of climate change mitigation has focused largely on nation states as 
the principal bearers of agency (Friedlingstein et al 2014, Höhne 2013, Matthews 2016, Müller 
et al 2009, Raupach et al 2014). Many authors, while de facto adopting an interpretation of 
accountability, have conducted qualitative (Ringius et al 2002) and quantitative (Baer et al 2009, 
Matthews 2016, Raupach et al 2014) analyses which allocate emissions mitigation efforts, often 
simultaneously addressing disparities in historical GHG emissions between nations. The concept 
of national historical accountability for climate change has prevailed in literature since the early 
1990s (Grübler and Fujii 1991, Smith 1992). Since then, nations have proposed different types of 
effort or burden-sharing frameworks for distributing emissions rights or budgets (i.e. allowable 
emissions). These have been based on various fairness principles, such as cumulative historical 
emissions, convergence of per-capita emissions over time, and the ability to pay based on GDP 
per-capita, among others (Ringius et al 2002). Many researchers have used these proposals in 
their studies to determine the allocation of future emissions rights: some have quantified 
historical cumulative emissions of states (Botzen et al 2008), while others have reasoned the use 
of national per-capita emissions (Baer et al 2000, Matthews 2016, Neumayer 2000). In addition, 
the grandfathering approach, which allocates budgets proportionally according to emissions at a 
particular base year (Neumayer 2000), has been used under international regimes such as the 
Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 1998) and the early phase of the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) (European Commission 2010). 
Neumayer (2000) introduced the concept of a historical emissions ‘debt’, which is determined by 
assuming an equal per capita allocation of emissions across countries. Countries are given a 
lower share of emissions if they have historically emitted in excess of an equal per capita share, 
while those who have emitted less than the equal per capita share are given an emissions ‘credit’ 
(Matthews 2016). Matthews (2016) later applied this principle to national historical emissions 
data. He found that countries with large debts included industrialized nations such as the United 
States, Russia, and Germany. Others with small debts or credits, tended to be developing 
countries such as Indonesia, or countries in industrial transition, such as India and China. These 
results capture a general pattern recognized in the literature, and also recognized by the parties to 
the UNFCCC, which is that industrialized nations produce the greater share of global emissions 
(UNFCCC 1992, Shue 1999). Though reasons other than economic development or 
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industrialization, namely geographic (Neumayer 2002, Neumayer 2004), have been proposed as 
factors influencing national emissions, the most prominent state emitters remain largely 
uncontested in the literature. Yet, developing policies that address these findings continue to be 
disputed, as there are various ethical issues arising from using a single effort-sharing framework. 
Accordingly, some authors have examined a multi-criteria approach, in which several fairness 
principals are employed in the solution (Müller et al 2009, Baer et al 2009). 
While most research has focused on production-based accounting, where emissions are attributed 
to the territory in which they are produced, some authors have explored consumer responsibility 
instead (Davis and Caldeira 2010, Davis et al 2011, Peters 2008, Lenzen et al 2007). Davis and 
Caldeira (2010) took a consumption-based approach to emissions accounting and attributed CO2 
emissions to countries according to their consumption of finished goods. They highlighted the 
resulting differences in emissions allocations, showing that the primary net importers of 
emissions were overwhelmingly developed countries including the United States, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and Germany. They also discussed ethical questions regarding the enabling of 
prosperity in developed countries by the emissions produced in other, often under-developed, 
countries.  
In contrast to focusing on national contributions, whether directly through historical emissions 
accounting, or indirectly through national per-capita emissions accounting, some attention has 
been given to emissions accounting at the city-level (Dodman 2009, Duren and Miller 2012). 
Though cities evidently fall under the jurisdiction of sovereign territory, policy and authority at 
the municipal or local level have significant potential to catalyze urban GHG emissions 
mitigation (Dodman 2009). 
2.1.2 Business 
Though accountability at the national level prevails in the literature, examining the roles of other 
actors has surfaced as well. This includes businesses that directly or indirectly use, or produce, 
fossil fuels. Some researchers have examined the role of fossil fuel producers as prominent 
actors contributing to climate change (Frumhoff et al 2015, Heede 2014). Frumhoff et al (2015) 
focused on the responsibility of fossil fuel producers and underlined the fact that only a small 
number of companies have produced a large quantity of GHG emissions. Despite having been 
aware of the environmental consequences and the alternatives available to them, these companies 
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continued to operate without sufficient efforts to change their behaviours (Frumhoff et al 2015). 
These companies had the knowledge to anticipate a transition to a low-carbon economy, and in 
spite of the viability of alternative low-carbon technologies, policies, and models, most have not 
pursued their implementation (Frumhoff et al 2015). 
Heede (2014) completed a quantitative analysis of the embodied carbon emissions of fuels from 
the world’s largest producers of coal, oil, natural gas and cement. The reasoning for this 
approach was to consider the function of those entities that extract, refine and market carbon 
fuels globally. He found that these fossil fuel producers were responsible for 63% of cumulative 
worldwide emissions of industrial CO2 and methane (CH4) from 1751 to 2010. Although Heede 
addressed the need to recognize the responsibility of corporate entities, he featured the roles of 
developing countries in supplying fossil fuels to the rest of the world, pressing that it may not be 
as simple as holding industrialized nations accountable for climate change. He found that a 
substantial amount of emissions embedded in fossil fuels have been extracted in Non-Annex 1 
(mostly developing) countries and nations that are not necessarily large-scale emitters (Heede 
2014). However, there is little discussion on the relationships existing between national-political 
and corporate structures, that perhaps influence the timing and location of fossil fuel production. 
He argued that Non-Annex 1 countries, that host much of fossil fuel production, also have an 
ethical obligation to help mitigate climate change because they have accrued ‘considerable 
benefits’. Yet, there is no mention of where these benefits are directed. In the case of most 
Annex 1 countries, it is evident that wealth has trickled down to consumers in their societies, but 
for Non-Annex 1 countries, the orientation of these benefits is unclear. Furthermore, there is no 
discussion of the political or economic influences that industrialized nations have on business 
activities in other less-developed countries.   
While Heede addressed one part of the supply chain, Davis et al (2011) examined all stages of 
the supply chain, incorporating trade and consumption as drivers of GHG emissions. They found 
that the number of entities extracting and refining fuels was relatively small, and that extraction 
points were concentrated geographically. In contrast, the burning of these fossil fuels for energy 
is widespread and generally occurs far from the points of extraction. Thereafter, goods and 
services produced by using this energy are often consumed at another, third, geographic point. 
Davis et al (2011) thus demonstrated the importance of accounting of carbon emissions at all 
stages of the supply chain, implicitly suggesting the allocation of mitigation efforts to any 
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business with a function in the supply chain stating that they “…all benefit in some way from the 
current fossil fuel-driven economy, just as they are all are vulnerable in some way to the climate 
change that results.”  
Frumhoff et al (2015) also highlighted the concept of a “social license” to operate, as 
stakeholders and communities are increasingly demanding corporate disclosure and transparency 
from companies. These realities give merit to allocating emissions reductions to companies 
producing fossil fuels which are inevitably burned and result in GHG emissions to the 
atmosphere. This is further justified as some of these companies have actively lobbied against 
climate action, despite full awareness of scientific evidence for anthropogenic climate change 
(Frumhoff et al 2015). Indeed, some companies have voluntarily disclosed information on their 
operations and related GHG emissions, which has allowed academic researchers to complete 
various forms of emissions accounting for industries including the cement industry (Cagiao et al 
2011), and the oil and gas industry (Heede 2014). Non-academic studies, such as those led by 
accounting firms, have also completed valuable studies on GHG accounting across sectors 
(Henderson and Trucost 2005, PricewaterhouseCoopers 2013). Though these studies address 
business accountability in some sense, they do not, however, take on the task of distinctly 
allocating mitigation efforts accordingly. 
2.1.3 Allocating mitigation efforts among companies  
If indeed businesses should be held accountable for their contributions to climate change, how 
would we effectively allocate emissions reduction efforts among them? It seems appropriate to 
begin with the various fairness principles established as methods for allocating emissions rights 
at the national level. Yet to date, there exist no comprehensive academic studies which account 
for corporate GHG emissions across all sectors globally, that would allow us to use these 
principles.  
This step of aggregating corporate emissions data is absent from the literature, although some 
authors have attempted to create business metrics that could be applied to different fairness 
principles in the allocation of emissions reductions. For example, the works of Hoffmann and 
Busch (2008) established metrics that evaluate carbon [emissions] performance, otherwise 
recognized as indicators of the level of a business’s carbon [emissions] efficiency. They 
presented the carbon intensity indicator, which measures the ratio of a company’s carbon usage 
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in absolute terms to a related business parameter (Hoffmann and Busch 2008). This is often 
represented as the ratio of a unit of emissions to a unit of production, either physical or 
monetary. Krabbe et al (2015) provided examples of indicators that could be used in different 
sectors, such as tons of CO2 per tons of cement for the cement industry, or tons of CO2 per US$ 
of value added (also, gross profit). Depending on the sector, either a physical or monetary 
parameters can be used. Krabbe (2015) stated that physical parameters, often in volume or 
weight of product, or other activity units such as MWh, are preferred for carbon intensity 
calculations because they can be better related to emissions and mitigation potential, as they 
represent a ratio between energy use and some physical quantity. Monetary parameters are used 
where physical parameters are not useful. This is the case for applications to more heterogeneous 
sectors, where there is either more than one product produced, or the sector is more service-
oriented (Krabbe 2015). Some examples of these parameters include EBITDA, turnover, value 
added, revenue, and market capitalization. 
Some non-academic publications use EBITDA as a denominator for carbon intensity (Henderson 
and Trucost, 2005, Societe Generale 2007), but do not thoroughly explain why it is preferable to 
other parameters, nor what the implications are of its use. EBITDA is considered a standard 
financial parameter which can be used to normalize data and provide a link between a measure of 
returns and carbon emissions (Henderson and Trucost, 2005), therefore allowing for comparison 
between company emissions contributions. Other financial parameters, such as turnover and 
market capitalization, have also been used when assessing corporate carbon performance, though 
are similarly poorly justified (Henderson and Trucost, 2005).  
In comparison to employing absolute emissions when assessing business contributions, an 
industry-appropriate emissions intensity indicator allows for a different type of comparison. In 
some ways, it takes into account differences in business structure, operations, and finances. 
However, neither assessing emissions intensity nor absolute emissions as approaches to 
determining corporate accountability have been applied to company emissions data at the global 
level.  
A parallel can be found between these approaches to establishing business accountability, and 
those principles used to assess national accountability. Considering absolute company emissions 
for the distribution of mitigation efforts is analogous to the grandfathering approach. This 
approach considers current or historical territorial emissions of a nation. Using carbon intensity 
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indicators, on the other hand, represents a normalization of company emissions – similar to how 
equal per-capita emissions normalize nationally contributed emissions.  
2.2 Carbon accounting and reporting 
There is a broad set of literature entertaining corporate responses to climate change, however 
exploring these responses requires an understanding of existing accounting and reporting 
infrastructures in place. Waddock (2008) discussed the evolving institutional infrastructure 
related to corporate responsibility, by categorizing initiatives into state/government, 
market/economic, and civil society groups. In doing so, she revealed the largely non-compulsory 
nature of the infrastructure and the profusion of various standards, certification and monitoring 
programs, and accrediting agencies. Altogether, the infrastructure results in some confusion and 
a need for consolidation (Waddock 2008). Jones and Levy (2007) may have provided an 
explanation for this disorder by illuminating the paradox of companies opposing government 
regulation, while embracing carbon management initiatives. Because measures controlling 
GHGs directly threaten sectors relying on or producing fossil fuels, it became a trend to 
accommodate to the pressures of climate change. Yet at the same time, companies are acting to 
create, shape, and preserve a regime that is desirable to business (Jones and Levy 2007). By 
adhering to many, but no government-led, concentrated, or stream-lined expectations of climate 
change action, it remains difficult to evaluate accountability accurately.   
Jones and Levy (2007), as well as Southworth (2009), brought to light the appeal and 
consequences of a voluntary infrastructure over a legislative one. Companies support voluntary 
approaches, as they have expressed concerns with federal regulation that would “stifle their 
ability to… tailor their industry’s efforts to maximize economically and environmentally 
favourable action” (Southworth 2009). Jones and Levy (2007) determined that businesses seem 
willing to take on only limited measures towards climate change, ones consistent with an overall 
fragmented and weak policy regime. As such, business responses are directed more towards 
organizational changes rather than emissions mitigation (Jones and Levy 2007). Nevertheless, 
motivations for voluntary action are plenty, but overall seem to have little to do with contributing 
to social good. They include improvements through efficiency and alternate energy supply, 
reduced petroleum dependence, having a more reliable energy market, boosting shareholder and 
investor confidence, preventing or preparing for the physical effects of climate change, 
improving industry reputation, having access to new markets, lowering insurance costs, and 
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preparing for restrictive carbon emissions legislation (Southworth 2009). As companies 
anticipated GHG control after the success of the Montreal Protocol in 1987, many voluntarily 
joined regional and/or local emissions trading groups with furtive aims of preventing the 
imposition of mandatory restrictions, shaping future trading systems, and acquiring a competitive 
advantage by gaining trading experience (Jones and Levy 2008). 
Waddock (2008) identified that too many entities are influencing the corporate responsibility 
infrastructure. Different expectations about corporate behaviours and practices are put forward, 
contributing to the overall disorder of business responses to climate change. Accordingly, some 
authors have attempted to make sense of these responses by commenting on the strategies that 
businesses take to address climate change or the management of their GHG emissions (Jones and 
Levy 2007, Sullivan 2009, Weinhofer and Hoffmann 2010). Many others have more precisely 
studied business carbon accounting methodologies and different disclosure routes, while 
identifying some of their pitfalls (Kolk et al 2008, Southworth 2009, Andrew and Cortese 2011, 
Schaltegger and Csutora 2012, Dragomir 2012, Haslam et al 2014). 
In analyzing the responses of 125 European companies to regulatory pressures reduce GHG 
emissions, Sullivan (2009) found that most have established management systems and processes 
necessary for them to manage their emissions, but the majority have yet to significantly reduce 
their emissions. He argued that uncertainties in climate change policy are the key barriers to 
companies taking a more proactive approach and actually reducing their emissions. Weinhofer 
and Hoffmann (2010) found complementing results while investigating the carbon strategies of 
91 electricity producers around the world. They found that strategies are likely subject to 
regional climate policies, and that most companies take long-term management measures, while 
some still do not even mention measures to reduce CO2 emissions. The trends show that there 
were significant differences between Japan, the US and the EU citing possible factors such as the 
lack of strong nation-wide regulations in the US, the ETS in the EU and the mandatory 
disclosure regulation in Japan. 
A significant contribution to the literature, by Andrew and Cortese (2011), explored the general 
regulation of carbon disclosure and the influence that self-regulation has on reporting and 
climate change related decision making. They considered the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), 
an institutional investor group and disclosure program holding the largest global repository of 
self-reported environmental data, including GHG emissions (CDP 2017). They also considered 
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the use of the GHG Protocol as a reporting model within the CDP. GHG Protocol Corporate 
Standard (WRI and WBCSD 2004) provides requirements and guidance for companies preparing 
a GHG emissions inventory, and is a standard that focuses on the accounting and reporting of 
emissions. Andrew and Cortese (2011) argued that as the CDP and GHG Protocol are voluntary 
regimes developed outside of the influence of democratically elected governments, and are 
largely the work of corporations, consultant accountants and non-governmental organizations, 
the reliability of the data produced is questionable. They claimed that the CDP is a capitalist 
driven approach to the climate crisis, which allows companies to dictate terms of new climate 
change strategies and policies. Furthermore, due to the absence of comparability as a 
requirement in the GHG Protocol standards, as well as the absence of a verification or audit, the 
usefulness of data from the CDP remains uncertain (Andrew and Cortese 2011). This is not 
helped by the fact that respondents of the CDP are not obligated to use the GHG Protocol as a 
guiding model, but are permitted to use other standards as well (Andrew and Cortese 2011).  
These regime features have likely set the stage for observations made in other studies of the 
reliability of corporate disclosure. Dragomir (2012) completed an extensive study on the 
sustainability reports of the top five largest European oil and gas companies from 1998 to 2010, 
using the GHG Protocol as the benchmark for emissions reporting. By reviewing the 
sustainability reports from companies, he found that there was an overall poor comparability 
between data reported on a yearly basis, a lack of some basic information such as descriptions of 
data collection, calculation methodologies, and a frequent reformatting of these methodologies 
without regard to previous years’ processes. He also evaluated some elements of the GHG 
Protocol including organizational versus operational boundary setting for emissions tracking. 
Dragomir (2012) identified a significant problem with the GHG Protocol’s two approaches to 
determining organizational boundaries: the equity share approach and the control approach. The 
equity share approach, which accounts for emissions based on the share of equity the company 
has in an operation falsely “…eludes the notion of operational control,” which is a prime 
measure for carrying out emissions reductions (Dragomir 2012). The control approach, which 
accounts for emissions the company has direct operational control over but not a financial 
interest in, “…neglects the responsibility accruing from an economic interest in the absence of 
full control.” Thus, with the option of choosing either approach for reporting, a company can 
conceivably dodge the accounting of some emissions it is responsible for. 
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Haslam et al (2014) conducted a study in which they made similar conclusions about current 
company approaches to carbon disclosure. They indicated that accounting of emissions are 
adapted due to the discretionary decisions made regarding what is or what is not within the 
operational or financial control of the company. Emissions reporting therefore continues to be an 
unclear process that companies have the potential to manipulate. Haslam et al (2014) also 
provided general recommendations for more workable frameworks using conceptual business 
models, however the study’s requirements for creating such models remain quite abstract and 
difficult to appreciate. Dragomir (2012) provided slightly more concrete suggestions, though his 
suggestions related specifically to changes in the GHG Protocol. This included adjusting the 
approaches to creating organizational boundaries for reporting, specifically expanding the 
reporting base under the notion of operational control by including branches in which the parent 
company has significant financial influence.  
The literature highlights not only some of the issues of consistency and reliability of reported 
information, but addresses the immanent infrastructural problems of existing frameworks used to 
disclose information. For this reason, some authors have provided recommendations for 
improved frameworks and disclosure policies (Dragomir 2012, Haslam et al 2014), while others 
have implied that an effective way of obliging action on climate change and reducing GHG 
emissions is for political authorities to impose legal restrictions (Jones and Levy 2007, 
Southworth 2009). Nonetheless, voluntarily disclosed corporate emissions information could be 
valuable for political and scientific discussions on assessing whether mitigation efforts are 
sufficient and for stimulating more political commitment where it is needed (Schaltegger and 
Csutora 2012).  
2.3 Future business emissions pathways 
With a patchwork of reporting frameworks to work with, companies have little guidance on how 
to formulate emissions targets that adhere to greater global climate goals. Though there exist 
global and national carbon emissions budgets, which are allowable CO2 emissions associated 
with a given global climate target (Matthews et al 2017), there are no clear carbon budgets 
provided for sectors, let alone companies. In light of this, Krabbe et al (2015) completed a study 
in which they provided a method for aligning business emissions targets with global climate 
goals. To allocate carbon budgets to sectors, they proposed the Sectoral Decarbonization 
Approach (SDA), for which they used a carbon budget associated with a 50% chance of keeping 
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warming below 2°C, specifically following the 2DS scenario from the International Energy 
Agency (IEA). They calculated sectoral intensity pathways by dividing sectoral emissions 
pathways in units of CO2, by the sector’s activity projections, which were either physical or 
monetary business parameters depending on the sector. Though such measurements of intensity 
have been established by other authors (Hoffmann and Busch 2008, Busch 2010), sufficient 
justification for the indicator choices was not provided, except that physical parameters were 
preferred over monetary ones, and that monetary parameters were used in cases where sectors 
had more heterogeneous activity.  
Based on the sectoral intensity pathways, individual company intensity pathways could be 
calculated (Krabbe et al 2015). The authors asserted that the SDA is a preferable approach for 
target setting because it attempts to account for structural differences across sectors, including 
mitigation potential, mitigation costs and expected activity growth. Growth and initial 
performance are accounted for by projected market share, and initial carbon intensity, 
respectively. The discord in this logic is that for companies with projected growing market 
shares, the quantity of absolute emissions is allowed to increase, while intensity is expected to 
improve. In light of the imminent and alarming consequences of climate change, along with the 
global political, economic, and social hurdles to mitigation, why should we be enabling 
companies to produce more GHG emissions? By considering corporate performance on the 
market before considering corporate performance in the environment, we are forgetting that the 
atmosphere does not respond to changes in company emissions intensity, but to changes in 
absolute emissions. Though the SDA methodology may adhere to set carbon budgets, companies 
should be aiming for long-term near-zero absolute emissions, as has been demonstrated to be 
requirement for stabilizing global mean temperatures (Matthews and Caldeira 2008).  
The SDA methodology has been utilized by the Science Based Targets (SBT) initiative, a 
collaboration between several organizations, including the CDP, World Wildlife Fund (WWF), 
and World Resources Institute (WRI). The initiative’s aim is “…that by 2020, science-based 
target setting will become standard business practice and corporations will play a major role in 
driving down global greenhouse gas emissions.” (Science Based Targets 2017a) The SBT directs 
companies to the SDA as one of the tools possible to set a ‘science-based target’. However, the 
SBT also provides other options, such as an absolute-based approach, and an economic-based 
approach. Without further explaining these approaches here, it is a blatant mis-step to offer 
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entirely different approaches for determining company targets, as the final calculated targets will 
evidently vary depending on the approach taken. If company targets can vary, then total carbon 
budgets can vary as well. SBT even states on their website that, “The method a company chooses 
to use depends on its particular circumstances. Some methods are better suited for certain 
sectors, or for companies that are growing. There is not one ‘best’ method but there will be one 
that will work best for your company.” (Science Based Targets 2017b) Indeed, there is no ‘best’ 
method, but in order to meet a global carbon budget, there should only be a single established 
method. Otherwise combined carbon budgets will not meet the global budget.    
Arguments aside, it is clear that powerful companies have not taken any type of target-setting 
seriously. A recent report evaluated energy data provided by Fortune 500 companies and found 
that less than 20 (5%) had “science-based targets” (CDP et al 2017).  
Altogether, it is apparent that in academic literature and beyond, more study into corporate 
target-setting and associated future emissions pathways is needed. With this, it is also essential to 
assess reported absolute emissions for their use in the allocation of mitigation responsibilities. 
2.4 Conclusions 
Literature pertaining to the concept of accountability for climate change and effort-sharing of 
mitigation is ample. Researchers have described the roles of various actors, including nations, 
and companies, in contributing to climate change. Though literature exploring business 
accountability, specifically, could be more developed, there are already compelling arguments 
that give merit to attributing climate change mitigation responsibilities to companies (Heede 
2014, Frumhoff et al 2015). Moreover, the methodologies, or principles, that could be used to 
allocate emissions reductions are not well defined. However, they can be construed as analogous 
to those principles employed in analyses at the national level.   
Heede’s work contributed greatly to the literature in terms of historic emissions embodied in 
fossil fuels, though examining a small number of companies. But to date, there exist no 
comprehensive academic syntheses of global company GHG emissions, that reflect all sectors of 
business activity. As most GHG data is voluntarily self-reported and often adheres to non-
government led reporting frameworks, it appears fragmented and may come across as unreliable. 
Nonetheless, it has not been readily experimented with in academic studies and the true extent of 
its range and reliability have not been confronted.  
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Although there is research which examines past and present carbon performances of companies 
using carbon performance indicators (Henderson and Trucost 2005, Societe Generale 2007, 
Weinhofer and Hoffmann 2010), these indicators are not, as of yet, fully instituted in business 
nor academia. Neither absolute emissions, nor emissions normalized by business parameters, 
have been put to use to calculate distributions of emissions mitigation efforts among companies. 
This appears to be in part a consequence of a lack of sound data, not simply because of the little 
information reported by companies, but also because of questions raised regarding reliability of 
existing reporting infrastructures. Business accountability is addressed somewhat by the SBT 
initiative, in that they provide methodologies for deriving emissions targets aligned with 
scientifically approved climate targets. However, because it issues more than one methodology 
for determining these targets, it raises the question of whether it properly promotes the 
achievement of a single global target. One of the approaches offered, the SDA, which relies on 
normalized emissions (that is, carbon intensity), allows for increases in absolute emissions. This 
sort of dispensation appears regressive when considering climate change action.  
To effectuate business accountability for climate change, proper emissions accounting and 
disclosure are required. Thereafter, mitigation is possible, but only with the provision of 
consistent and accurate information guiding companies in creating targets aligned with global 
climate change objectives. The business world remains largely disoriented concerning emission 
reductions targets, and requires quantifiable objectives that rest within the global 1.5°C and 2°C 
carbon budgets. The literature does not provide an analysis or a synthesis of reported company 
emissions across sectors, and consequently does not explore the use of absolute emissions in the 
allocation of future emissions rights. This is a project that would contribute to our understanding 
of the effort-sharing of climate change mitigation among businesses, as well as contribute to our 
general knowledge of corporate commitments to battling climate change. It would also be 
informative to policy-makers aiming to institute future requirements or regulations of GHG 
emissions. This is an identifiable gap in the literature, one that should be promptly addressed in 




3.1 Introduction  
It is now commonplace to recognize the ethical issues that come with assigning responsibility for 
climate change, and the effort-sharing of climate change mitigation (Shue 1999, Ringius et al 
2002, Page 2008, Raupach et al 2014). These issues are concerned with determining who the 
responsible actors are and how accountability itself should be measured. The concept of 
“common but differentiated responsibilities” (UNFCCC 1992) has not successfully addressed 
these ethical questions, and has also been set exclusively in the context of national (state-level) 
responsibility. Yet, it is not national governments that physically emit large amounts of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) to the atmosphere, but rather the business entities that operate within 
their borders. Businesses play a dual role in climate politics: they are the principal players in the 
production of major GHG emissions, and yet they carry the greatest potential for reducing future 
emissions through informed business decision-making. Nevertheless, statistics on corporate 
emissions within national borders have not been clearly established. 
So, how do we hold companies accountable for their actions, specifically their contributions to 
climate change? A first important step is to understand what these contributions are, in terms of 
GHG emissions. Yet in the absence of legal authorities at both the international and national 
levels, businesses are not under great pressure to report their emissions, which makes their 
contributions difficult to measure. Some, however, are joining the trend of voluntary disclosure 
as a result of emerging corporate responsibility infrastructures and pressure from non-
government stakeholders (Waddock 2008), by publicly disclosing an increasing amount of 
environmental information. This information, which often includes GHGs emitted directly by 
companies, has yet to be thoroughly explored for its potential and usefulness in climate change 
research. A second practical step could be to formulate future business mitigation objectives that 
fall in line with global climate change objectives. Presently, because the task has been largely 
left to national governments, neither companies, nor sectors on the whole are being instructed to 
mitigate emissions according to climate science recommendations.  
Drawing on these objectives, I first collect available carbon emissions data provided by 43,756 
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companies from around the world, and evaluate the reporting activity occurring at the sectoral 
level. I also use financial market information to better understand emissions reporting patterns. 
With the emissions data, I allocate sectoral carbon emissions budgets aligned with targets of 
remaining below an increase of 1.5°C, and 2°C in global average temperatures. These goals have 
been defined as acceptable levels of climate change by the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2009). Finally, I 
make use of the determined carbon budgets to suggest possible sectoral mitigation pathways that 
serve as preliminary guidelines for future business emissions activity. 
3.1.1 Dimensions of accountability 
3.1.1.1 Who plays a role in climate change?   
In this section, roles are discussed, firstly, with the understanding that there are principal actors 
that contribute to climate change, and thus carry some blame. There are many actors at different 
levels of society who could therefore be held accountable.  
Recent literature has largely focused on nation states as the principal bearers of responsibility 
(Friedlingstein et al 2014, Höhne 2013, Matthews 2016, Müller et al 2009, Raupach et al 2014). 
This approach uses the assumption that nations can be viewed as responsible for climate change 
because their respective governments should have (in theory) the authoritative structures in place 
to control the emissions of GHGs within their borders.  
The role of individuals as contributing actors has also been studied, particularly how income 
inequality influences the impact of an individual on climate change (Roberts 2001, Baer et al 
2009, Chakravarty et al 2009). Roberts (2001) examined income inequality and its link to GHG 
emissions, highlighting that the world’s richest people cause emissions thousands of times higher 
than that of the world’s poorest. Fahlquist (2008) illustrates the usefulness of examining 
inequality and individual responsibility together, arguing that individuals are blameworthy for 
acts that contribute to environmental [climate] problems, but only in circumstances where 
choosing a more climate-friendly decision is reasonable. 
Business is another key actor contributing to climate change, because of the direct and indirect 
GHG emissions caused by using or producing fossil fuels. Some researchers have examined the 
role of fossil fuel producers (Frumhoff et al 2015, Heede 2014) as contributors to climate change 
due to the emissions embodied in extracted fuels. And while many authors have assessed GHG 
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accounting methods and disclosure (Kolk et al 2008, Sullivan 2009, Southworth 2009, Andrew 
and Cortese 2011, Dragomir 2012, Haslam et al 2014), most GHG inventory studies have been 
completed by non-academic authors, such as those led by accounting firms (Henderson and 
Trucost 2005, PricewaterhouseCoopers 2013). On the other hand, a more objective attempt at 
accounting of corporate emissions is lacking in the literature.  
3.1.1.2 Approaches to emissions accounting 
Broadly, there are three presiding methods for emissions accounting, all of which identify steps 
in the supply chain of CO2: extraction-based, production-based, and consumption-based 
emissions accounting. First, extraction-based accounting calculates the emissions embodied in 
fuels extracted and assigns the emissions to the entity responsible for the extraction (Davis et al 
2011). Production-based accounting calculates the emissions from the combustion of fuels in the 
production of goods and services (Davis et al 2011) and assigns these emissions to the location 
where they are produced. By contrast, consumption-based accounting tracks the emissions that 
are embodied in trade, and assigns them to where the products or services are consumed rather 
than where they are manufactured (Davis and Caldeira 2010). The use of any of these approaches 
leads to varying results with respect to actors’ climate contributions. These methods can be, and 
have typically been, applied to calculations of national contributions to climate change. 
However, they can also be analogously applied to companies, and in some manner, individuals.  
At the national level, production-based accounting is the most widely used approach. Emissions 
produced within state borders are considered territorial or production-based, and many authors 
have made attempts to account for these emissions (Botzen et al 2008) and allocate mitigation 
responsibility according to this method (Matthews 2016, Raupach et al 2014). In contrast, Davis 
et al (2011) used extraction-based accounting as part of their evaluation of the distribution of 
emissions along the supply chain, tracing emissions back to the countries in which fuels were 
extracted. Taking a consumption-based approach, Davis and Caldeira (2010) attributed CO2 
emissions to countries according to their consumption of finished goods. They highlighted the 
resulting differences in emissions allocations, showing that the primary net importers of 
emissions were overwhelmingly developed countries.  
At the individual level, it is more difficult to map the three approaches of emissions accounting 
analogously, as the extraction of fuels is not specifically demanded or executed by single 
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individuals. However, accounting for emissions from burning of fuel for transportation or other 
needs, can be likened to production-based emissions. Chakravarty et al (2009) considered high 
individual emitters and allocated responsibilities according to a universal individual emission 
cap. This approach treats high emitting individuals equally, no matter which country they reside 
in. Conversely, Baer et al (2009) focused on high individual incomes to determine climate 
burdens, which may be viewed as an indicator for consumption, and thus analogous to 
consumption-based accounting.  
The national accounting approaches could be made applicable to corporate level emissions 
accounting as well. Extraction-based emissions can be calculated as those emissions embodied in 
fuels extracted by companies. Heede (2014) used this accounting method to attribute 
responsibility to the corporate entities that extract, refine and market carbon fuels globally. He 
also recognized the role of the countries in which the companies operate, drawing attention to the 
fact that a substantial amount of emissions embedded in fossil fuels have historically been 
extracted in developing countries, ones that are not necessarily large-scale emitters. The 
production and consumption-based approaches may be linked to what the GHG Protocol has 
established as Scope 1, and Scope 2 and 3 emissions, respectively. Scope 1 emissions, as defined 
by the WRI and WBCSD (2004) are those emissions coming from sources owned or controlled 
by the company, for example, from combustion in boilers, furnaces, or vehicles, or emissions 
from chemical production in process equipment. Scope 1 company accounting thus resembles 
production-based accounting in that it refers to the direct emission of GHGs from the burning of 
fuels. Scope 2 indirect emissions are those that result from the generation of purchased electricity 
consumed by the company, while Scope 3 emissions are a consequence of the activities of the 
company, but occur from sources not owned or controlled by the company3 (WRI and WBCSD 
2004). Both Scope 2 and Scope 3 emissions therefore resemble consumption-based emissions in 
that they represent emissions embodied in goods (material or electricity) or services that are 
consumed by individual companies. Some authors have investigated issues with accounting of 
the various scopes of emissions (Schaltegger and Csutora 2012, Haslam et al 2014), however the 
literature does not provide a comprehensive inventory of these emissions.  
 
3 Examples include production of purchased materials or use of products and services (WRI and WBCSD 2004). 
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3.1.1.3 How to hold actors accountable and distribute mitigation efforts 
Once a method for emissions accounting is established, there remains the question of how to 
allocate climate change mitigation efforts. In the past, nations have proposed different types of 
effort-sharing frameworks based on various fairness principles (Ringius et al 2002). Broadly, 
these approaches include considering historical emissions, wealth (i.e. the ability to pay), per-
capita emissions, or current (or other base year) shares of emissions to allocate future emissions 
rights. Botzen et al (2008) quantified cumulative historical emissions of nations, while others 
have argued for the use of national per-capita emissions (Baer et al 2000, Neumayer 2000, 
Matthews 2016) or included ability to pay based on GDP per capita in their analysis (Winkler et 
al 2002). Note that the grandfathering approach, which allocates future emissions proportionally 
according to emissions at a specified base year (Neumayer 2000), has been used under 
international regimes such as the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 1998) and the early phase of the EU 
ETS (European Commission 2010). When applied to nations, however, the grandfathering 
allocation method only weakly reflects principles of international equity. 
These burden-sharing frameworks were developed for nations, and it is not obvious how they 
may be applied or adapted in the business context. These difficulties, along with the lack of 
comprehensive data available on company emissions, might explain the lack of studies 
completed on the sharing of emissions budgets among companies. 
To advance research in this field, I outline analogous approaches. Grandfathering appears as the 
most viable approach to allocating emissions responsibilities to business because we need only 
know the current share of emissions across companies or sectors. Cumulative historical 
emissions may prove difficult to determine, as companies emerge, merge, and disintegrate often 
and sporadically, thus emissions could be difficult to assign to one entity. If the per capita 
approach in some way normalizes historical or current shares of emissions, we may similarly 
find ways to normalize company emissions measured in absolute terms. The work of Hoffmann 
and Busch (2008) established metrics that evaluate company carbon performance, otherwise 
understood as indicators of the level of carbon efficiency of a businesses. Krabbe et al (2015) put 
these metrics to use, providing examples of indicators that could be used in different sectors, 
such as tons of CO2 per tons of material produced for homogenous industries, or tons of CO2 per 
US$ of value added [gross profit] for heterogeneous industries. Finally, it might be plausible to 
distribute emissions responsibilities according to ability to pay, which in the company’s case 
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may be determined by market value or another financial metric representing the worth of a 
company. However, many wealthy companies operate in sectors in which there are little to no 
direct emissions, welcoming arguments against this approach.   
3.1.1.4 Pathways consistent with climate goals  
Once emissions budgets are assigned to an actor, it is helpful to identify future pathways of 
emissions reductions that are aligned with the allocated budget. Though it has been shown that 
the emission pathway taken is independent of the associated cumulative emissions budget 
(Zickfield et al 2009), sustained high emissions in early years carry consequences later on, 
namely the need for more drastic and rapid reductions (Stern 2007). Similar consequences would 
of course apply to the business world, however the pathway opportunities in this context need 
further investigation. Krabbe et al (2015) attempted to fill this void by creating carbon intensity 
pathways for companies based on a scenario in line with a 2°C carbon budget. However, their 
results were based on hypothetical sectoral emissions and activity data, rather than accounted 
absolute emissions. 
3.1.1.5 Purpose of the study 
Overall, there has been little academic exploration of voluntarily disclosed emissions data from 
companies, and more broadly, not enough investigation into the role of business in climate 
change. Businesses are largely unguided when it comes to creating emissions targets and 
aligning their activities with global climate objectives. The main purpose of this study is to 
encourage business accountability for climate change by highlighting emissions contributions 
from companies using voluntarily disclosed data, and by providing sectoral emissions budgets 
and future pathways in accordance with the climate goals of remaining below a 1.5°C and 2°C 
average global temperature increase. I also aim to provide relevant information on reporting 
patterns and market values of contributing companies that may help us better understand the 
composition of these reporting companies.  
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Data collection 
I gathered GHG emissions data from The Bloomberg Professional Service (The Terminal), a 
software system and platform providing real-time data and analytics of financial markets and 
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securities (Bloomberg Finance L.P. 2017). GHG emissions data are available in several variables 
in The Terminal, including different forms of Scope 1, Scope 2, and Scope 3 emissions. For the 
purposes of this research, I considered only Scope 1 emissions data, as including Scope 2 and 
Scope 3 emissions data would result in overlap or double-counting of emissions across sectors. 
Scope 1 variables in The Terminal are sourced either from data collected by Bloomberg analysts 
from company public reports, or from the CDP, an institutional investor group and disclosure 
program holding the largest global repository of self-reported environmental data (CDP 2017).  
Using the data collected from The Terminal, I categorized all listed and active companies for the 
year 2015 according to the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sectors. GICS is a 
four-tiered, hierarchical industry classification system, with 11 sectors, 24 industry groups, 68 
industries and 157 sub-industries (MSCI Inc. 2017). Though there exist other classification 
systems, such as ICB (ICB 2017) and SICS (SASB 2017), GICS is a reputable system that has 
also been used in previous analyses of environmental performance and efficiency (Artiach et al 
2010, Kumar 2014, Chang et al 2015) as well as analyses on disclosure (Blanco et al 2016). A 
table of the GICS sectors and their definitions may be found in Appendix A: Table A.1.  
It should be noted that reporting of GHG emissions data often coincides with financial reporting, 
and so I collected GHG emissions data for the 2015 fiscal year4, rather than the 2015 calendar 
year which begins January 1st and ends December 31st.  
I collected data for three emissions variables that represent emissions of Scope 1 nature from The 
Terminal: 1) Direct CO2 Emissions, 2) Scope 1/Direct GHG Emissions, and 3) Scope 1 Activity 
Emissions Globally, henceforth referred to as Direct 1B, Scope 1B, and Scope 1C, respectively. 
The definitions of these variables, which are sourced from The Terminal, can be found in 
Appendix A: Table A.2. It is important to note that Direct 1B accounts for CO2-only emissions, 
while Scope 1B and Scope 1C may involve other GHGs. I also collected data on company 
 
4 Fiscal reporting dates may differ across companies, though in many cases the calendar year is the same as the fiscal 
year. GHG emissions data filtered for the fiscal year also return more data points than when filtered for the calendar 
year, as some companies do not report in accordance with the calendar year.  
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market capitalization5 for the 2015 fiscal year, which I used as an indicator of company size.  
3.2.2 Data aggregation: estimations and statistical testing 
To facilitate the analysis, I merged the three variables, Direct 1B, Scope 1B and Scope 1C, into a 
single variable, Scope 1 Merged (henceforth Scope 1M). Merging the data renders the data more 
complete, whereby it accounts for various company emissions disclosure methods: e.g. some 
companies may disclose only to the CDP, while others may disclose in their annual public 
reports – both of which are picked up by The Terminal. Where companies reported emissions in 
more than one of the three variables (Direct 1B, Scope 1B or Scope 1C), I have taken the 
maximum reported emissions value.  
It is important to recognize two limiting factors in the data. First, although Scope 1B and Scope 
1C, by definition, should represent the same emissions, it is not always the case that companies 
report the same value for each. Second, Scope 1B and Scope 1C are reported in CO2-equivalent 
(CO2e), potentially representing GHGs other than CO2, and differ from those of Direct 1B (CO2-
only). This distinction is important given that I will be using the CO2-only derived carbon 
budgets provided by Matthews et al (2017) to generate sectoral future emissions pathways. 
The first limiting factor is due to company oversight, but the difference between Scope 1B and 
Scope 1C data may not be so great that using them interchangeably would cause inaccuracy in 
the analysis. After confirming that the data on reported emissions were not normally distributed 
in any of the sectors, I used the Wilcoxen Signed Rank (Matched-Pairs) test at a 5% level of 
significance to verify whether these data were significantly different. This test assumes no 
normality in distribution, and assumes that the data are dependent6. The results for every sector 
(Appendix A: Table A.3), indicated that there was no difference between the data in Scope 1B 
and Scope 1C, thus justifying the use of Scope 1B and Scope 1C data interchangeably. 
The second limiting factor is that the constituent emissions, and thus the units, for Scope 1B and 
Scope 1C (CO2e) differ from those of Direct 1B (CO2). This can be resolved by making some 
 
5 The company’s worth calculated by multiplying the shares outstanding by the price share, in USD (Bloomberg 
L.P. 2016). 
6 The Scope 1B and Scope 1C data are dependent as they are from the same group of companies. 
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rudimentary estimations. To convert Scope 1B and Scope 1C to data represented in units of CO2, 
it is necessary to estimate the proportion of CO2-only emissions in Scope 1B and Scope 1C CO2-
equivalent (CO2e) emissions. I took the following steps to make these estimations for each 
sector:  
1. Where companies reported both Direct 1B and Scope 1B emissions, I calculated the 
proportion of Direct 1B to Scope 1B.  
2. Where companies did not report Scope 1B emissions, but reported both Scope 1C and Direct 
1B, I calculated the proportion of Direct 1B to Scope 1C. 
3. Where companies reported neither Scope 1B or Scope 1C, but reported Direct 1B, I assumed 
the proportion of CO2 to be equal to 1. This indicates that 100 % of the company’s emissions are 
assumed to be CO2-only. 
4. In the case where proportions were calculated to be greater than 1 (implying error on the part 
of the company’s reporting), I adjusted the proportion to be equal to 1. 
5. Where no emissions were reported, no estimation was made for the proportion of CO2.  
6. To calculate the CO2-only emissions, CE, estimate for sector S, I used Equation 3.1,  
 𝐶𝐸𝑆 = ∑(?̅?𝐼𝐺
𝐼𝐺𝑆
× 𝑀𝐸𝐼𝐺) (3.1) 
 
where 𝐼𝐺𝑆 is the index for 𝐼𝐺 different industry groups in sector S, ?̅?𝐼𝐺  denotes the mean of all 
estimated proportions for an industry group 𝐼𝐺, and 𝑀𝐸𝐼𝐺  is the total Scope 1M emissions in an 
industry group 𝐼𝐺. ?̅?𝐼𝐺  is thus applied as the proportion for all companies in industry group 𝐼𝐺, 
and the sum of these values gives a CO2-only emissions estimate for its corresponding sector, S. 
See Appendix A: Table A.4 for all sectoral and industry group Scope 1M emissions and CO2-
only estimates. 
I determined the percentage of market capitalization represented by companies reporting Scope 
1M emissions by dividing the sum of the market capitalization of reporting companies by the 
sum of the market capitalization of all companies in the chosen sector.  
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3.2.3 Allocating CO2 emissions budgets to sectors 
I used the grandfathering approach to calculate sectoral budgets according to the climate targets 
of remaining below global-mean warming of 1.5°C and 2°C. I used the model-based estimates 
for ‘effective’ global carbon budgets provided by Matthews et al (2017), and adjusted the 
estimates to a 67% level of confidence of remaining below a warming of 1.5°C and 2°C (i.e. 
‘likely’ to occur). These estimates are 2565 GtCO2 and 3427 GtCO2, respectively. These 
effective carbon emissions budgets account for non-CO2 warming, by assuming approximately 
15% of total warming is caused by non-CO2 GHGs and aerosols (Matthews et al 2017). I used 
the 2015 global estimate of CO2 emissions presented by CDIAC, which is 9.90 GtC, converted to 
36,262 MtCO2 (Boden et al 2016), to determine the percentage share of global emissions 
constituted by Scope 1M reported emissions. I applied this share to the 1.5°C and 2°C emissions 
budgets to obtain the budget that would be allocated to companies sectorally. Sectoral budgets 
were calculated according to each sectors’ share of total Scope 1M emissions.  
3.2.4 Creating sectoral emissions pathways 
Pathways can be described as trajectories, or long-term patterns of yearly emissions resulting 
from the usage of an allocated emissions budget. I created sectoral pathways with the intention of 
providing some guidance on future business emissions, while highlighting the consequences of 
different business futures in the context of global climate targets. It is important, however, to 
recognize that the sectoral budget allocations are only applicable to those companies that 
reported emissions in their respective sectors in 2015.  
I created three emissions pathways per sector: a linear, exponential, and logistic pathway. Each 
sectoral pathway was derived in accordance with the emissions budget allocated and is thus only 
informative for the companies in the sector that reported emissions appearing in Scope 1M data.  
Each pathway is represented by: 
 𝑓(𝑡) = 𝜀𝑡 (3.2) 
where t denotes time in years and ε denotes emissions in MtCO2. 𝜀0 is established as the 𝐶𝐸𝑆 






where Z is the corresponding emissions budget, represented by the area spanning from an upper 
limit, u, and lower limit, l.  
 The linear pathway equation is represented as: 
 𝑓(𝑡) = 𝜀𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡 + 𝑏 (3.3) 
where b is the y-intercept 𝑓(2015)= 𝑡0, and 𝑎 is the slope of the line.  
The exponential pathway equation is represented as: 
 𝑓(𝑡) = 𝛼𝛽𝑡  (3.4) 
where 𝛼 is the y-intercept 𝑓(2015), and 𝛽 is solved using integration of 𝑓(𝑡) where 




and the corresponding sectoral budget, Z, is equal to the area under 𝑓(𝑡) spanning 𝑡 = 2015 as 




 𝛼𝛽𝑡𝑑𝑡 = 𝑍 (3.6) 





where A is the upper asymptote (prescribed as 𝑓(2015)), e is Euler’s constant, k is prescribed 
as - 0.24 for the 1.5°C budget, or - 0.1 for the 2°C budget (see Appendix B for justifications). B 




𝑑𝑡 = 𝐴𝑙𝑛(𝑒𝑘𝑡 + 𝐵)/𝑘 (3.8) 
and the corresponding sectoral budget, Z, is equal to the area under 𝑓(𝑡) spanning 𝑡 = 2015 as 







𝑑𝑡 =  −𝑍 (3.9) 
Equation solutions for all sectoral pathways, along with their corresponding budgets, may be 
found in Appendix A: Table A.5.  
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3.3 Results  
3.3.1 Corporate reporting and market capitalization 
The Terminal listed 43,756 active public companies, from all over the world and across sectors 
(Bloomberg L.P. 2016). Of these companies, only 3,011, or 6.9%, reported emissions appearing 
in Scope 1M in 2015. The breakdown of reported emissions by sector shows that the Industrials, 
Materials, and Consumer Discretionary sectors make up almost 50% of the companies reporting 
in 2015, while Telecommunication Services, Real Estate, and Healthcare each make up under 
5% of the total (Figure 3.1). These shares also depend on the size (number of companies) of the 
sector (see Appendix A: Table A.4). To consider differences in sector sizes, I calculated the 
percentage of reporting within each sector, as well as the percentage of market capitalization 
shared by reporting companies (Figure 3.2).  
Figure 3.1 Breakdown of reported emissions by sector for 2015. Depicts reports from 3,011 companies across 
sectors. Sectoral composition depends highly on the size of the sector 
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The sectors with the largest percentages of reporting were Utilities and Telecommunication 
Services, with close to 20%. This was well above the amount of the following sectors following: 
Industrials, Energy, and Consumer Staples, for which the reporting percentage was under 8%. 
The lowest percentages of reporting, of below 6%, included the Healthcare, Real Estate, 
Information Technology, and Consumer Discretionary sectors. Reporting companies make up the 
largest shares of sector market capitalization for the Information Technology sector (75.2%), 
followed by the Real Estate (72.5%) and Consumer Staples (71.6%) sectors. Interestingly, these 
sectors also have the greatest differences between reporting and market capitalization. The 
lowest percentage of market capitalization made up of reporting companies was in the 
Healthcare sector (30.9%), followed by the Energy (47.6%) and Financials (48.8%) sectors. 
Reporting companies make up 6.9% of public companies worldwide, and 56.8% of total global 
market capitalization of public companies in 2015. Total emissions reported across all sectors 
was 7828 MtCO2e, where the CO2-only estimate was 6881 MtCO2. The sum of all CO2-only 
Figure 3.2: Percentage of market capitalization represented by reporting companies and percentage of 
reporting, within sectors, in 2015. Sector reporting represents Scope 1M emissions data 
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emissions amounts to 19% of global CO2 emissions in 2015 as reported by CDIAC (Boden et al 
2016). Results in Figure 3.3 show that, starting with the greatest emissions, Utilities reported 
2967 MtCO2e, Materials 2098 MtCO2e, Energy 1470 MtCO2e, and Industrials reported 805 
MtCO2e. The remaining sectors reported less than 180 MtCO2e. Notably, the 
Telecommunications Services sector reported the least (12 MtCO2e), followed by the Healthcare 
(18 MtCO2e) and Real Estate (21 MtCO2e) sectors.  
The CO2-only estimate for Utilities is 2557 MtCO2e, 409 MtCO2e less than the Scope 1M 
reported emissions, implying that this portion of reported emissions represents GHGs other than 
CO2. Similarly, the difference between Scope 1M and CO2-only for the Materials sector is 228 
MtCO2e, 180 MtCO2e for the Energy sector, and 59 MtCO2e for the Industrials sector. The 
Figure 3.3: Scope 1M emissions for 2015 by sector, with estimates of CO2-only emissions. The vertical (Y) axis 
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greatest percentage differences7 between Scope 1M and CO2-only are 28% for Real Estate, 
followed by 26% for Healthcare, and 21% for Information Technology. The smallest percentage 
differences between Scope 1M and CO2-only are 3% for Consumer Discretionary, followed by 
8% for Industrials, and 9% for Telecommunication Services.  
3.3.2 Sectoral emissions budgets 
Using model-based estimates for effective global carbon budgets provided by Matthews et al 
(2017), and adjusted to a 67% confidence level, I determined the carbon emissions budget 
associated with a global mean warming of 1.5°C allocated to all reporting companies to be 
100,905 MtCO2, and for a warming of 2°C to be 264,429 MtCO2. If regarded as budget 
boundaries, the sectoral allocations for the 1.5°C and 2°C emissions budgets also provide a range 
of possible budgets for each sector (Figure 3.4). The smaller 1.5°C budget is visible at the lowest 
 
7 See Appendix B for calculation of percentage difference. It is not the same as percentage change, which compares 
an antecedent value to a new value and is divided by the antecedent value. 
Figure 3.4: Ranges for allocated carbon budgets associated with the 1.5°C and 2°C climate targets. The 
budget associated with 1.5°C is depicted by the low-end of the range, and 2°C by the high-end of the range 
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end of each range, while the 2°C budget is visible at the highest end of each range (Figure 3.4). 
The Utilities sector holds the largest budgets, 37,503 MtCO2 (98,281 MtCO2) for the 1.5°C (2°C) 
target, as well as the greatest range of 60,777 MtCO2. Utilities are followed by the Materials and 
Energy sectors, with 1.5°C budgets of 25,421 MtCO2 and 18,916 MtCO2, and 2°C budgets of 
71,860 MtCO2, and 49,572 MtCO2, respectively. The budget range for the Materials sector is 
44,439 MtCO2, and 30,655 MtCO2 for the Energy sector. The smallest 1.5°C and 2°C carbon 
budgets are allocated to Telecommunication Services with 162 MtCO2 and 426 MtCO2, 
respectively. Likewise, this sector has the smallest budget range which is 263 MtCO2. Sectors 
similarly low allocated budgets are Information Technology, Consumer Discretionary, and 
Consumer Staples.  
3.3.3  Sectoral emissions pathways 
I derived three emissions pathways for each sector according to the allocated budgets for the 
1.5°C and 2°C scenarios (Figure 3.5). Only the pathways of sectors with the smallest 
(Telecommunications) and largest (Utilities) allocated carbon budgets are shown here, with 
pathways for the remaining sectors provided in Appendix C. The graphs in Figure 3.5 exhibit 
pathways from 2015 to 2100 for the Utilities sector (Figure 3.5a and c), which has the largest 
allocated budgets, and the Telecommunications sector (Figure 3.5b and d), which has the 
smallest allocated budgets. The three varying pathways, each represented as linear, exponential, 
and logistic trajectories, are relevant to each sector and budget scenario. The equations derived 
(Appendix A: Table A.5) for all pathways correspond to the allocated sectoral carbon budget, 
which is represented as the integral of the curves. It is noteworthy that each pathway carries 
different mitigation implications. While for the linear pathway the rate of change or the reduction 
in emissions stays constant, the exponential pathway implies a higher rate of emissions reduction 
in earlier years, which decreases with time. Due to the parametric restrictions of the exponential 
equation, the exponential pathway is asymptotic to the x-axis, and thus does not reach 0 MtCO28.    
 
8To adjust the exponential pathway so as it would reach near-zero values at 2100, two arithmetical approaches can 
be taken: reducing the sectoral budget, or extending the upper limit to a later date. I chose not to change the sectoral 
budget or extend the upper limit so as to remain true to the methodology. Moreover, extending the upper limit only 
allowed for small reductions in end of century emissions. In reality, a sector following an exponential pathway may 
adjust its pathway near 2100 to a linear pathway in order to reach true zero emissions.  
 37 
 
This is especially apparent in the Figure 3.5c and d, where the larger sectoral budget for the 2°C 
scenario results in emissions slightly above zero at 2100 for the exponential pathways. The 
logistic pathway is characterized by an ‘S’ shape, where the decay rate of emissions is initially 
increasing, and changes to a decay rate that is decreasing at the point of inflection. Due to these 
characteristics, the logistic pathway allows for higher emissions than both the linear and 
exponential pathways in earlier years of mitigation, but eventually falls below the linear and 
Figure 3.5: Sectoral emissions pathways for reporting companies in MtCO2/year, a-d. Utilities sector pathways of 
the 1.5°C budget (a), Telecommunication Services sector pathways of the 1.5°C budget (b), Utilities pathways of 
the 2°C budget (c), and Telecommunication Services sector pathways of the 2°C budget (d) 
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exponential pathways in the later years. Due to the parametric limitations of the logistic function 
(see Equation 3.7), with t0 = 2015, 𝜀0 is slightly below the emissions values reported in 20159.  
Pathways derived for the Utilities and Telecommunications sectors for same 2°C budget appear 
identical in shape (Figure 3.5c and d), though the scale of emissions differs greatly. The linear 
pathway of the Utilities sector has a mitigation rate of approximately 33 MtCO2/year, while for 
the Telecommunications sector it is approximately 0.14 MtCO2/year. The linear pathways reach 
0 MtCO2/year in the year 2092. For the 2°C budget (Figure 3.5c and d), the annual emissions of 
the exponential pathway is less than that of the linear pathway until 2083, at which point the 
exponential pathway allows for higher residual yearly emissions than the linear pathway. For the 
smaller 1.5°C budget (Figure 3.5a and b), the exponential pathway will reach close to 0 
MtCO2/year, while for the larger 2°C budget, the parametrics of the equation will restrict the end 
of century rate to above 0 MtCO2/year. The logistic pathway has a decay rate of emissions which 
is increasing until its inflection point, where the decay rate begins to decrease. The logistic 
pathways in Figure 3.5c and d allow for higher yearly emissions than the linear pathway until 
2054, and until 2066 for the exponential pathway. The greatest difference in yearly emissions is 
between the logistic and exponential pathways in 2038. For the Utilities sector this difference is 
684 MtCO2, while for the Telecommunications sector it is 3 MtCO2. In comparing the two 
sectors (Figure 3.5c and d), it is noteworthy that the vertical axes bounds between Utilities and 
Telecommunications are very different. Pathways were set according to the initial reported CO2-
only estimate of emissions in 2015, so naturally, sectors like Utilities that reported higher 
emissions will have greater yearly emissions than those that reported less.  
Similarly, the pathways for the 1.5°C budget (Figure 3.5a and b) of the Utilities and 
Telecommunications sectors mirror each other as well. However, these pathways appear notably 
different from those of the 2°C budget (Figure 3.5c and d). That is, they tend to approach near-
zero emissions much earlier in the timeline than those pathways of the 2°C budget, and 
emissions mitigation is concentrated in the beginning of the timeline rather than spread out over 
the 85-year period. The linear pathway reaches 0 MtCO2/year in the year 2046, which is 46 years 
 
9 In reality, the trajectory of the logistic curve in the first several years of the pathway may be adjusted so as to reach 
the correct starting emissions point in 2015.  
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before that of the 2°C budget. Likewise, the exponential and logistic pathways approach zero 
much earlier than for the 2°C budget; near 2080, and 2050, respectively. The greatest difference 
in yearly emissions is between the logistic and exponential pathways in 2023, though this 
window is significantly smaller than that of those in Figure 3.5c and d. For the Utilities sector 
this difference is 379 MtCO2, while for the Telecommunications sector it is 1.7 MtCO2. Recall 
again that the vertical axes bounds between the Utilities and Telecommunications sectors are 
different due to their distinct sectoral budgets.  
3.4 Discussion 
3.4.1 Emissions, reporting, and market capitalization 
It is both meaningful and surprising that the small number of companies (3,011) that report their 
emissions accounted for almost a fifth of global CO2 emissions in 2015. This disproportionate 
share of climate change contributions among businesses is not unlike those patterns observed in 
other studies. Though using an extraction-based accounting approach, Heede (2014) found 
complimentary results underlining that there is centralized control of fossil fuel extraction by a 
small group of businesses. Similarly, other authors that have focused on national contributions 
have also shown that a small number of countries are causing the majority of global GHG 
emissions (Botzen et al 2008, Matthews et al 2016). 
It is remarkable that this small 6.9 % of all monitored companies in The Terminal already 
accounted for 19% of global CO2 emissions, and moreover, that these reporting companies also 
made up more than half (56.8%) of the global market share in 2015. This is evidence showing 
that the reporting companies are some of the largest companies in the world (evaluated by 
market capitalization). It also provides us a better understanding of the composition of 
companies making up such a large portion of global emissions, and why they may be 
concentrated in the hands of a few thousand companies. Though a relationship between reported 
emissions and market capitalization has not been established, this research will show that some 
weak correlations can be observed (section 4.3.1). With further research and greater availability 
of data, the possibility of stronger correlations existing could help predict corporate accounted 
emissions, and even provide an element of external validation for accounting.  
The low reporting rates across sectors are surprising as well. Despite many available avenues for 
corporate carbon disclosure, including the simple measure of reporting emissions in company 
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annual reports, the majority of the world’s businesses have chosen not to report their emissions. 
This highlights one major difficulty with business accountability for climate change, since 
accountability requires a certain degree of transparency. Without this transparency, the progress 
on climate change mitigation action is strongly impeded. For example, this is evident when 
placed in the context of international climate change agreements. Drafting such agreements with 
defined global climate targets, and associated national targets, is only plausible once nations are 
aware of each other’s emissions contributions and development histories. Despite acknowledging 
that to reach the climate targets of remaining below an average global temperature increase of 
1.5°C or even 2°C requires near-zero emissions in the future, we cannot assume that these goals 
can be reached in the absence of accounting. In order to facilitate emissions reductions, aside 
from having access to mitigation resources, accounting is necessary because it tracks progress. 
The benefits of tracking progress are twofold: first, it identifies problems and gaps in mitigation 
efforts, both at the company and sectoral levels, and second, it allows for comparability between 
companies. Identifying which mitigation efforts are not successful is important because reaching 
emissions reduction targets along the pathway to zero emissions carry different effort 
requirements, and become more difficult with each new target. Thus, perfecting, or at the least 
improving mitigation efforts in the early stages will help facilitate more difficult mitigation 
required in the long-term. Comparability is important for the accountability aspect of mitigation. 
While some companies may be reporting and actively reducing emissions, other companies 
reporting may not be doing the same. As Sullivan (2009) conveyed in his study, not all 
companies with established management of GHGs are significantly reducing emissions. Thus, 
through the accounting of emissions, we can identify those companies that need to carry out 
more or more effective mitigation efforts. Simply stated, emissions accounting is crucial to 
establishing business accountability.  
Some sectors, including Industrials, Materials, and Consumer Discretionary, though comprising 
a greater portion of global reporting (Figure 3.1), did not also show high rates of reporting within 
their sectors in 2015 (Figure 3.2). These sectors represent the manufacture of various goods, 
many of which presumably produce substantial GHG emissions. Despite this, reporting of 
emissions in these sectors was highly unsatisfactory, considering that these sectors assume 
energy-intensive activities, and that there reported emissions were already much higher than 
those of other sectors. In contrast, the Telecommunications Services sector, made up of only 420 
companies, has one of the highest reporting rates, along with one of the lowest reported 
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emissions. This sector appears different from the others in the sense that it does not follow the 
same pattern of poor reporting relative to its size and emissions reported. The case of the Utilities 
sector also appears unique. Despite being a sector comprised of under a thousand global power 
producers, it had almost a fifth of its companies reporting emissions in 2015. It is the only 
energy-intensive sector with a relatively high reporting percentage, while it is also one of the 
smallest sectors consisting of only 936 companies. It is beyond the scope of this study to predict 
the sources of pressure for reporting, but it is clear that other energy-intensive sectors such as 
Industrials, Materials, and Energy, do not follow the same reporting pattern as the Utilities 
sector. Similarly, less energy-intensive sectors such as Healthcare and Real Estate do not follow 
the same reporting pattern as the Telecommunications Services sector. 
A better understanding of the composition of companies reporting within sectors can be 
formulated with an assessment of market capitalization represented by these companies. If 
considering, in order, the sectoral reporting percentages, there is no clear pattern of associated 
market capitalization. However, some deductions can be made specifically from each sector’s 
case. For example, the reporting companies in the Real Estate and Information Technology 
sectors represent over 70% of the sectors’ market capitalization, while the reporting is below 6%. 
This reveals that the few companies reporting actually have an exceptional reach over the 
markets of their respective sectors and would thus be considered ‘large’ companies. On the other 
hand, the Financials sector, which has a similar reporting percentage, has a much lower 
represented market capitalization (48.8%). Yet, its results are still better than that of the 
Telecommunication Services, which has the second highest reporting percentage (17.8%), but a 
represented market capitalization of only 54.9%. Thus, judging by the results of Figure 3.2, it 
cannot be concluded that reporting percentages in sectors are reflective of their represented 
market capitalizations. Deductions made regarding the impact of market capitalization on 
reported emissions, however, requires further investigation (see Chapter 4). 
Two key deductions can be made regarding the pathways displayed in Figure 3.3. First, if only 
considering the nature of the activities in the sectors themselves, the results are predictable. 
Sectors including Utilities, Materials, Energy, and Industrials, which are more energy-intensive, 
(see their definitions in Appendix A), reported the highest emissions. Second, when considering 
the reporting rates in each sector, the true pattern of emissions becomes unclear. Evidently, those 
sectors with more companies reporting emissions, are more likely to have higher reported 
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emissions at the sectoral level. On that account, if the other energy-intensive sectors reported at 
rates closer to that of the Utilities sector, I would expect the data displayed in Figure 3.3 to 
change significantly.   
While global estimates of CO2 made up 76% of total GHG emissions in 2010 (IPCC 2014c), the 
CO2-only estimates depicted in Figure 4.3 make up 88% of the total Scope 1M emissions 
reported in 2015. Given that most global non-CO2 emissions are CH4 (Montzka et al 2011), and 
that the main anthropogenic source of CH4 is agriculture (Kirschke et al 2013), one explanation 
for this over-estimation is that companies in the agriculture business do not report emissions 
enough for an accurate estimation of a CO2-only emissions proportion. The latter explanation is 
justifiable as only 89 of 1701 companies listed in the Food Products industry (which includes 
sub-industries of Agricultural Products, Meat, Poultry and Fish, and Packaged Foods and Meats) 
of the Consumer Staples Sector report emissions found in Scope 1M data. Yet, even if over-
estimating, the sectoral results for CO2-only emissions estimates would not change considerably 
if the sectoral proportions estimated in section 3.2.1 were adjusted to the IPCC global estimate 
for 2010.  
Overall, the results suggest that if serious mitigation action was to be taken by a relatively small 
set of companies in the world, we might expect notable global emissions reductions.  
3.4.2 Implications of the grandfathering approach 
As an initial effort to distribute responsibility among companies, and in light of constraints on 
the availability of emissions data, the grandfathering approach is a reasonable option for several 
reasons. Firstly, this approach is defined by a simple calculation, and requires minimal data, 
allowing for the greatest transparency. Secondly, other allocation approaches are presently not as 
viable in the context of business. Approaches considering historical emissions are limited by the 
absence of company emissions accounting, year-to-year inconsistencies in emissions accounting, 
unascertained allocations after mergers and acquisitions, and historical emissions that would be 
unaccounted for due to company closures. Approaches considering current emissions normalized 
by physical or monetary business parameters are promising, but require data on company activity 
outputs, as well as established indicators that would be appropriate for different companies. 
Research has been conducted on such indicators (Hoffmann and Busch 2008, Busch 2010), and 
could be useful for future studies allocating business carbon budgets. A third, and more 
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debatable reason for using the grandfathering approach, is its greater potential in getting high-
emitters to cooperate (Knight 2013).  
Though the grandfathering approach has been challenged in literature addressing emissions 
entitlements in the national context (Neumayer 2000, Caney 2009), many of these arguments 
have ethical foundations which I assert are not easily translated to the business context. For 
example, the argument for the right to develop in the national context indicates that individuals 
in every country have an equal right to the global resource atmosphere (Neumayer 2000). But, 
translating such an argument based in ethics to the business context is contentious. Business in 
itself is defined by profit achieved through the selling of goods and services, but ones not always 
necessarily beneficial to the public. Is business development meant to benefit society and 
individual livelihoods? Should small companies with low emissions that, nevertheless, aspire to 
expand, produce, and sell, be allowed to increase their GHG emissions in the anticipated low-
carbon future? I argue that companies in these positions should embrace new business structures 
and initiatives that result in stringent emissions mitigation as soon as possible. I believe it is 
possible to grow business without also increasing contributions to climate change and if 
companies are meant to develop (and let us assume development in the economic sense), then 
they should do so without turning to arguments based in ethics meant for individuals and their 
nations. Creating targets that account for growth and initial performance (Krabbe et al 2014) is a 
risky approach, and ignores some of the very reasons for why global emissions remain so high: 
that companies, despite having knowledge of the environmental consequences of their activities, 
have continued to operate in a business-as-usual manner (Frumhoff et al 2015).  
The grandfathering approach results in a proportional distribution of emissions budgets 
according to current emissions trends in the sectors, which is evident when comparing the 
mirroring patterns of Figures 3.3 and 3.4. Not only do the budgets increase with increased 
reported emissions, but the budget ranges (1.5°C to 2°C) increase as well. Consequently, 
companies with greater emissions have more opportunities (and would thus be more inclined) to 
mitigate emissions at different levels, while remaining in agreement with the 2°C budget. They 
also have the choice of assigning themselves targets within the budget ranges that are in line with 
their immediate capabilities. Despite the argument against allocating larger budgets to high-
emitters, the grandfathering approach does indeed penalize high-emitting sectors in the sense that 
these sectors will need to reduce more emissions than others with lower emissions, in order to 
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reach zero emissions by the end of the century. For example, it is conceivably more difficult to 
mitigate an allocated budget of 10,000 MtCO2 than 1,000 MtCO2. Allocating a greater carbon 
budget does not suggest that mitigating these emissions will be easier.   
3.4.3 Implications of different emissions pathways  
The pathways introduced in section 3.3.3 are idealistic trajectories, but each pathway presents 
differentiated and realistic challenges to emissions mitigation.  
The linear pathways are uncomplicated trajectories, and are perhaps best suited as a point of 
comparison for the exponential and logistic pathways. Because the emissions reductions per year 
remain constant throughout the linear timeline, the implications of following this pathway lie in 
the assumption that every unit of emissions mitigated is equally difficult to mitigate. Following 
this mitigation pathway in the first few decades appears challenging, but feasible if compared to 
the stringent mitigation required for the first few years of the exponential pathways. Yet, 
emissions reduction at near-zero stages of the linear pathways will not be as easily and 
consistently mitigated. These emissions can be likened to those ‘committed’ emissions from 
existing infrastructure pointed out by Davis et al (2010). Though originally placed in the context 
of the national emissions, the idea that there are existing infrastructures that are anticipated to 
live out their regular lifetimes and that would otherwise be difficult to eradicate completely, is 
also relevant in the business context. A simple but effective example would be that a company 
producing energy by coal-burning is unlikely to replace its coal plants with wind turbines or 
solar panels as an initial attempt to reduce emissions. Rather, the company will look for more 
economic ways to do so in the first several years, such as reconfiguring plants to accommodate 
other lower carbon-emitting fuels. To reach near-zero emissions, some companies will need 
complete overhauls of their business structures and objectives. Given these insights, the linear 
pathway is a good point of comparison to other pathways carrying greater consequences either in 
the beginning, or the end of their timelines.    
For companies that foresee having difficulties in mitigating emissions near-zero, the exponential 
pathway would be a more appealing option. This pathway, unlike the linear pathway, does not 
assume that every unit of emissions is equally difficult to mitigate, but accommodates for slower 
near-zero emissions reductions. The pathway begins with stringent emissions reductions as the 
rate of emissions per year begins higher than that of the linear and logistic pathways. The rate of 
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reduction is highest at the start but continually decreases, resulting in lower year-to-year 
emissions reductions in the later years. The disadvantage to the exponential pathway is the need 
for immediate and rapid emissions mitigation.  
In contrast, the logistic pathway accommodates companies that do not have the immediate 
capabilities to reduce emissions quickly and immediately. The rate of emissions reductions in 
early years is even less challenging than the linear pathway. The other advantage is the slower 
rate reduction when nearing zero emissions, also allowing for existing infrastructures to live out 
their lifetimes. However, the difficulty presented in the logistic trajectory is the large increase in 
emissions reductions per year required as the pathway approaches the inflection point. The 
inflection point is identified at the point where the emissions reduction rate is at its maximum. 
The reduction rate at the inflection point of the logistic pathway is greater than any point on 
either the linear or exponential pathways, and could present problems if companies are not ready 
to commit to stringent action at a point where emissions have already been reduced significantly. 
One of the core assumptions in these trajectories is that companies within their respective sectors 
all have the same zero-emissions date. This is irrespective of company size, location, or other 
factor that may differentiate companies. Yet, these factors play relevant and important roles in 
determining company accountability, and in this context, setting zero-emissions deadlines. In 
parallel, discussions of national emissions allocations have recognized various factors and ethical 
considerations, such as historical contributions, per-capita contributions, ability to pay, and 
geography (Ringius et al 2002), that may differentiate national responsibilities. Though the 
sectoral pathways I have presented here are consistent in regards to the zero-emissions target 
dates, these restrictions can be adjusted in consideration of, for example, company location. It 
would be viable to extend a zero-emissions target date for companies located in developing 
countries and roll back the target date for those located in developed countries, if the justification 
for doing so is appropriate. 
Each pathway provides companies with different opportunities, as well as drawbacks. The 
viability of a specific pathway can only be inferred when there has been thorough evaluation of 
the company’s mitigation capabilities, and most importantly those capabilities in the short-term. 
With timely mitigation action, companies can avoid the risk of confronting future challenging 
mitigation requirements with which they might have difficulty coping. As a result, some of the 
drawbacks mentioned may even be diminished.   
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3.4.4 Implications of the 1.5°C and 2°C carbon budgets 
It is evident from Figures 3.4 and 3.5 that adjusting the global climate target by only 0.5°C has 
significant consequences for business sectors. The allocated budget under the 1.5°C scenario, 
being almost a third of that of the 2°C budget, severely restricts the flexibility of future 
pathways. The differences between the linear, exponential, and logistic pathways under the 1.5°C 
budget are much less prominent than those of the 2°C budget. All three pathways follow similar 
trajectories up to about 2040, when they begin to approach near zero emissions, as opposed to 
years nearing the end of the century, as observed for the 2°C scenario. These results tell us that 
with constrained budgets such as that of the 1.5°C scenario, pathways become more difficult to 
differentiate, and the advantageous characteristics previously mentioned of choosing one 
pathway over another become more obsolete. Moreover, regardless of the pathway chosen, it is 
clear that stringent mitigation efforts are imperative in the first several years. This is a conclusion 
not unlike those presented in previous studies in the context of nations (O’Neill and 
Oppenheimer 2002, IPCC 2014a).  
3.4.5 Limitations 
3.4.5.1 Data from The Terminal  
Though The Terminal contains information on publicly traded companies from all over the 
world, it is not exhaustive. Private companies or enterprises, by definition, are not traded on the 
market, and therefore do not appear in The Terminal. Given this, it may be interesting to 
examine private company voluntary disclosures and their estimated GHG emissions in future 
research. It is, however, critical to acknowledge that the company-level emissions data amassed 
in The Terminal are unlikely challenged by other known or accessible sources. The Terminal 
remains a critical, but not fully explored, source of environmental information and related data 
for academics. 
3.4.5.2 Reporting methodologies and avenues 
Given the lack of emissions disclosure at the global level, both the budgets and sectoral pathways 
provided are informative only in so much as they present viable options for business emissions 
mitigation and can only be inferred for those companies that have reported some form of Scope 1 
emissions in 2015. It is without doubt that allocating sectoral budgets using the methods 
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presented in this research is most constructive when accounting is properly verified and 
regulated for consistency and accuracy, and when most companies, or at the least all high-
emitting companies, report their emissions. However, it is the largely non-compulsory nature of 
the existing corporate sustainability infrastructure (Waddock 2008) that has likely contributed to 
the lack of corporate emissions reporting, as well as the lack of assured authenticity.  
This non-compulsory infrastructure is a product of what I perceive as a corporate paradox. 
Companies have outwardly opposed government regulation, yet at the same time have 
recognized the climate problem and supported voluntary approaches to disclosure (Jones and 
Levy 2008, Southworth 2009). The potential of GHG control by an authoritative infrastructure 
born in government legislation does not necessarily offer an ideal future for high-emitting 
companies. To resist such government-prescribed requirements, companies have accommodated 
to the pressures of climate change, all the while acting to design their own reporting 
infrastructure (Jones and Levy 2007). This included being heavily involved in developing the 
GHG Protocol, a recognized accounting tool and reporting model (Andrew and Cortese 2011). 
Yet, most companies in the world still do not have internal emissions accounting mechanisms in 
place to disclose information on their carbon emissions. It is evident that, regardless of the 
motives and design of carbon disclosure frameworks in the GHG Protocol and the CDP, without 
government interference and legislation of regulation and reporting, it will remain a difficult task 
to hold companies accountable for their contributions to climate change.  
In addition, the issue of data authenticity is brought to light. Due to the absence of comparability 
as a requirement in the GHG Protocol standards, as well as the absence of verification or audit 
requirements, data from the CDP has been argued to be dubious (Andrew and Cortese 2011). 
Though comparability between companies, as well as accounting accuracy by the companies, are 
important qualities of data, we should not dismiss the data as unhelpful altogether. Certainly, the 
emissions reported by companies are not arbitrarily fabricated, and companies that are reporting 
have done so realizing the opportunities in proactive action. Advantages include having a more 
reliable energy market, boosting shareholder and investor confidence, lowering insurance costs, 
and preparing for eventual emissions legislation (Southworth 2009). Moreover, if little other 
company-level emissions data is available for use in academic research, I deem voluntarily 
disclosed data a good place to begin.  
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3.4.6 Prospects for mandatory and voluntary disclosure  
At present, there are very few places in the world where companies are exposed to government 
legislation on GHG emissions. A few exceptions include the EU and Japan. The EU has in place 
the ETS, which follows a cap and trade system on emissions for companies with power plants, 
factories, or other installations (European Commission 2010). Japan, though it does not have a 
cap on emissions, requires companies emitting GHGs to follow national accounting guidelines 
and report their emissions (Ministry of the Environment 2012). These examples should, and can, 
be considered as models for legislation in other countries. Naturally, there is no one blanket 
solution for regulation that makes sense for every country. But, if we are to hold business 
accountable for their contributions to climate change, government becomes the only reliable 
institution – one without direct capital incentives - equipped to impose regulation of corporate 
emissions.  
It is unclear whether the emergence of voluntary disclosure schemes is a consequence of the 
absence of federal legislation in most countries (Jones and Levy 2007), or whether is because of 
the influence that businesses may have on government authorities (Southworth 2009). If it is the 
former, then we might expect more swift action from governments in implementing emissions 
legislation. But unfortunately, if it is the latter, then we can expect more challenges in this 
process. Unfortunately, ties between government and business are not always transparent, and 
lobbying by corporate bodies might influence the stringency and effectiveness of regulation and 
reporting requirements. I will not delve further into vindicating such claims, but I do contend that 
government regulation of corporate GHG emissions reporting would bring about more reliability 
and consistency in company-level emissions data. It would lead to more streamlined and 
consistent accounting methods, verification and audits that would increase reliability and 
accuracy, and comparability between companies in similar industries. Implementing regulation 
and emissions quotas should be a principal goal for all current, if not, incoming, government 
parties. Yet, we must not in anticipation, delay research on company-level emissions. Rather, we 
must take advantage of increasing corporate transparency and for the present, rely largely on 
voluntarily disclosed information.  
In light of absent government action and overall pressure on companies from various 
stakeholders to report environmental information, in the short term we can expect more 
widespread voluntary disclosure avenues and company emissions reporting. Despite some of the 
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pitfalls of the current voluntary disclosure infrastructure, it is that which has increased corporate 
transparency, and not government-led initiatives.  
3.4.7 Unlikely mitigation without accounting 
Regardless of the state of disclosure avenues, it is of paramount importance that companies 
develop lasting capabilities of measuring their GHG emissions, and at the least, their Scope 1 
emissions. Climate change mitigation is based on the premise of reducing GHG emissions in a 
timely manner, given that the environmental consequences of climate change are already 
catching up to us. Furthermore, science has determined what quantities of emissions in the 
atmosphere can result in disastrous climate effects, and what reductions are needed to prevent 
them. It follows that if companies are to be held accountable and contribute to mitigation efforts, 
and thus adhere to these stipulations, they must track their emissions going to the atmosphere. 
Without measuring GHGs emitted, companies will have nothing to compare to, and little to 
knowingly improve on. Then, there is even greater reason for accounting of CO2 only emissions, 
rather than what many companies are doing which is aggregating different GHG emissions into 
one value represented in CO2e. This was the case for companies reporting a Scope 1B or Scope 
1C variable. All carbon budget estimations made in past studies can be applied to CO2 emissions 
only (Rogelj et al 2016). If we expect companies to follow global climate goals, and thereby, 
global carbon budgets, then emissions accounting and reporting should give CO2 emissions 
calculations priority. On the other hand, future research on emissions budgets for different GHGs 
would be advantageous as well.  
3.5 Conclusion 
In this work, I have approached climate change responsibility from a different perspective, 
including business in the climate change conversation and highlighting the need for corporate 
disclosure and guidance in a carbon constrained future. For successful global climate change 
mitigation, all levels of society must be included in the process. This especially means including 
those entities that directly contribute to climate change by emitting large quantities of GHGs, 
particularly CO2, into the atmosphere. Recognizing that these actors are predominantly 
businesses, many of which carry out energy-intensive operations, some degree of responsibility 
for climate change must be accepted. With this responsibility, comes transparency and mitigation 
efforts; transparency in the form of consistent and accurate accounting and reporting of GHG 
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emissions, and mitigation in the form of emissions reductions in accordance with specific global 
climate targets.  
Broadly, I have assessed three elements of business in this work: reported company emissions, 
sectoral reporting patterns, and market capitalization of reporting companies, by sector. I found 
that sectoral reporting percentages were overall not representative of reported Scope 1M 
emissions and that they were also not reflective of their represented market values. I have 
amassed company-level GHG emissions data that has not been previously evaluated for its 
potential in informing us of business emissions contributions at the global scale. The results 
showed that a small 6.9% of the world’s public companies were reporting some form of Scope 1 
emissions, and that they accounted for 19% of global CO2 emissions in 2015. I have also 
attempted to apply established methods for accounting emissions and allocating emissions 
budgets to business, using them to determine sectoral emissions budgets and future emissions 
pathways. In light of recent climate discussions, I have included budgets associated with both 
1.5°C and 2°C global mean warming scenarios. I allocated sectoral budgets according to absolute 
reported emissions, a task not yet attempted in the literature. I provided three principal future 
emissions pathways in line with these budgets for each sector, each carrying different 
implications for businesses. Pathways constrained to the 1.5°C budget particularly suggest that 
early and stringent mitigation is preferable as near-zero emissions reductions are significantly 
more challenging than initial reductions. For companies that cannot afford immediate action, the 
logistic pathways provide flexibility in early years for reaching budget targets, but forecast 
rigorous emissions reductions in years approaching mid-century. 
In an effort to anticipate challenges to using voluntarily disclosed company emissions data in 
academic research, I have identified some of limitations which stand in the way of appreciating 
this data. Alongside these limitations, I reassert that with time ticking on the climate clock, and 
unconfirmed action to come from government authorities, this type of data should be used to the 
greatest possible potential – not simply to track business contributions to climate change, but 
also to show companies that their accounting and mitigation efforts are not unrecognized, and 
that they do indeed have impacts on climate change.  
If academics and society at large expect successful climate change mitigation in the near future, 
businesses must also be held accountable alongside other important actors. Moreover, if 
companies are looking to reap any benefits in a carbon-constricted business world, they will need 
 51 
to be prepared with the tools and knowledge required for accurate emissions accounting, 




4.1 Other factors contributing to company-level emissions 
Just as there is a need to consider historical, political, or geographic factors when assessing 
national accountability for climate change, there also exist various factors for evaluating business 
responses to climate change beyond considering only absolute emissions. These may include, but 
are not limited to, location of the company – be it the headquarters or location(s) of operations –,   
size in regard to market value, profit, or other financial indicator representing the state of 
business activities, and the nature of business activities – determined by industry classification. 
The impact of these factors may be linked to company exposure to different social, government, 
industry, or economic pressures, authorities, and infrastructures (Christmann 2004, Reid and 
Toffel 2009, Liu and Anbumozhi 2009). Consequently, these varying exposures can impact 
company strategies and actions towards carbon accounting, disclosure, and mitigation action.  
Though it is challenging to understand the impact of the aforementioned factors in a manner that 
would allow for an equitable evaluation of company commitments to battling climate change, I 
provide a glimpse into the potential significance of two of them: company location and size. In 
this chapter, I specifically aim to get a better understanding of whether the country location 
provides insight into the disclosure of emissions, and whether company size evaluated by market 
value has an impact on reported company emissions.  
To represent company location, I used company country of domicile, defined as the company 
location of senior management (Bloomberg L.P. 2016). This is different from location of 
company operations, which can represent more than one location. To represent company size, I 
used market capitalization, defined as the market value [in USD] of a company’s outstanding 
shares, in 2015 (Bloomberg L.P. 2016). I collected these data from The Terminal. 
4.2 Additional methods 
4.2.1 Is market capitalization an indicator of emissions? 
To develop an understanding of the relationship between emissions and company size, I focused 
on four key sectors: Utilities, Energy, Materials, and Industrials. I chose to analyze these four 
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sectors because they reported the highest emissions in 2015 compared to other sectors, and as 
described in their definitions, are the most energy intensive sectors.  
Using R Statistical Software, I first plotted Scope 1M emissions data against market 
capitalization for each sector to visualize the relationship. I then used Spearman’s rank and 
Kendall’s tau correlations to measure monotonicity and test the association between market 
capitalization and Scope 1M emissions, at a significance level of 0.05. Both statistics are used on 
non-parametric data, and do not assume normality in the data. Though Kendall’s tau is preferred 
because it is less sensitive to ties in the data as well as other discrepancies, complimentary 
(differentiated) results from conducting both tests could strengthen (weaken) the conclusions.   
4.2.1 Is corporate reporting and company location associated? 
The data on company country of domicile, as represented by the location of senior management, 
spans 119 different countries. The main challenge in using this data is first determining what 
type of country may or may not impact a company’s decision to report emissions. This would 
require insight into, for example, a country’s political and legal structures, history, or social or 
corporate norms. As an initial, but not conclusive step, I categorize countries into two groups: 
Annex 1, and Non-Annex 1 countries, as designated by the UNFCCC (2014). Annex 1 countries 
consist of generally developed or industrialized countries, while Non-Annex 1 countries consist 
of generally developing countries (UNFCCC 2014). I thereby aim to develop a better 
understanding of the relationship between disclosure of emissions and geographic location based 
on whether the company is located in a developed or developing country.  
Recognizing that the dataset of public companies and their locations is a population, rather than a 
sample of data, I have chosen to represent the data as is, avoiding statistical manipulations. I 
separated the data into groups of companies located in Annex 1 and Non-Annex 1 countries, and 
also into groups of companies reporting and not reporting emissions. I employed the raw counts 
of observations in each of the categories to create contingency tables which I visualized as 
mosaic plots (Figure 4.3). The sizes of the mosaic tiles are proportional to the observations 
counted for each category.  
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4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Descriptive findings 
Table 4.1 provides a glimpse of company data in the Utilities, Energy, Materials, and Industrials 
sectors, showing the top 10 highest reported Scope 1M emissions, along with market 
capitalization and country of domicile. No single country of domicile stands out as dominating 
the top 10 emitting companies, save the Utilities sector where the United States is the country of 
domicile for 5 out of the top 10 companies. What is more evident is that Annex 1 countries 
dominate the top 10 of every sector. The few countries of the Non-Annex 1 group appearing 
Table 4.1 include Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa in the Energy sector, Mexico and India in 
the Materials sector, and Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong (Hong Kong) in the 
Industrials sector.  
Non-reporting companies of high market value over $10 billion, are not predominantly in either 
Non-Annex 1 or Annex 1 countries (Table 4.2). This is because the two countries that appear 
most frequently on the lists in Table 4.2 are the United States (Annex 1) and China, including 
Hong Kong (Non-Annex 1). China dominates the Utilities and Industrials sector lists, while the 
United States dominates the Energy sector list. The few other companies from Non-Annex 1 
countries in Table 4.2, each appearing only once, include Côte D’Ivoire, Malaysia, and Nigeria 
in the Materials sector, and India and Saudi Arabia in the Utilities sector. 
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 Table 4.1: Top 10 companies in the Utilities, Energy, Materials, and Industrials sectors by  









RWE AG 182 Germany $7,822,068,122 
ENGIE 133 France $42,499,857,604 
AMERICAN ELECTRIC 130 United States $28,613,634,048 
DUKE ENERGY CORP 126 United States $49,116,319,744 
SOUTHERN CO 121 United States $42,653,765,632 
ENEL SPA 120 Italy $39,767,239,759 
TOKYO ELECTRIC P 108 Japan $8,816,293,023 
NRG ENERGY 106 United States $3,698,016,768 
E.ON SE 98 Germany $18,946,884,911 
AES CORP 77 United States $6,381,360,128 
Energy Companies 
GAZPROM 124 Russia $42,878,844,656 
EXXON MOBIL 121 United States $323,960,209,408 
PETROBRAS-PREF 79 Brazil $22,065,777,407 
ROYAL DUTCH SH-A 76 Netherlands $144,116,924,416 
PETROBRAS ARGT-B 72 Argentina $1,233,048,611 
SASOL LTD 62 South Africa $17,612,061,251 
CHEVRON 58 United States $169,377,939,456 
BP PLC 49 Great Britain $95,872,319,488 
TOTAL SA 44 France $109,408,657,408 
ENI SPA 43 Italy $53,999,383,846 
Materials Companies 
ARCELORMITTAL 176 Luxembourg $7,015,733,760 
LAFARGEHOLCIM-RE 165 Switzerland $30,469,341,463 
NSSMC 95 Japan $17,339,554,493 
POSCO 83 South Korea $11,327,166,779 
JFE HOLDINGS INC 59 Japan $7,771,662,582 
HEIDELBERGCEMENT 55 Germany $15,440,849,911 
US STEEL 45 United States $1,167,322,752 
CEMEX SAB-CPO 44 Mexico $7,358,291,086 
VEDANTA LTD 40 India $4,027,461,264 
SABIC 38 Saudi Arabia $61,146,190,572 
Industrials Companies 
AMERICAN AIRLINE 42 
 
United States $26,452,758,528 
AP MOLLER-B 37 Denmark $27,709,052,928 
DELTA AIR 35 United States $39,476,559,872 
UNITED CONTINENTAL 31 United States $20,892,102,656 
DEUTSCHE LUFT-RG 28 Germany $7,351,942,606 
AIR FRANCE-KLM 28 France $2,290,052,120 
INTL CONS AIRLINE 26 Great Britain $18,218,500,075 
NIPPON YUSEN KK 26 Japan $3,271,162,156 
WASTE MANAGEMENT 19 United States $23,865,843,712 
MITSUI OSK LINES 19 Hong Kong $2,434,652,642 
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Table 4.2: Companies with market value over $10 billion in 2015 not reporting Scope 1M emissions  
in the Utilities, Energy, and Materials sectors  
Company  Country of Domicile Market Capitalization (USD) 
Utilities  
CHINA YANGTZE-A China $34,487,860,613 
CKI HOLDINGS Hong Kong $23,342,674,494 
PPL CORP United States $22,998,738,944 
CHINA NATIONAL-A China $22,889,279,470 
HONG KG CHINA GS Hong Kong $22,674,080,633 
HUANENG POWER-H China $18,186,918,817 
SAUDI ELECTRICIT Saudi Arabia $17,439,903,474 
CGN POWER-H China $17,006,407,141 
NTPC LTD India $16,061,548,553 
ZHEJIANG ZHENE-A China $15,702,375,892 
GD POWER DEVEL-A China $11,903,824,840 
Energy 
PETROCHINA-H China $222,238,181,065 
SINOPEC CORP-H China $88,465,051,202 
ENTERPRISE PRODU United States $51,481,104,384 
CHINA SHENHUA-H China $43,394,493,180 
KINDER MORGAN IN United States $33,260,019,712 
COAL INDIA LTD India $27,878,122,988 
ENERGY TRANSF PA United States $19,787,595,776 
PIONEER NATURAL United States $18,729,265,152 
WILLIAMS PARTNER United States $16,802,741,248 
SINOPEC OILFIE-A China $15,697,357,778 
MAGELLAN MIDSTREAM United States $15,446,841,344 
ENERGY TRANSFER United States $14,384,727,040 
TENARIS SA Luxembourg $14,091,631,616 
NATIONAL OILWELL VAR United States $12,584,363,008 
CONCHO RESOURCES United States $11,991,752,704 
MPLX LP United States $11,956,320,256 
Materials 
CROWN SIEM Côte d'Ivoire $46,458,667,995 
LYONDELLBASELL-A United States $38,249,041,920 
NORILSK NICKEL Russia $19,718,131,712 
INNER MONGOLIA-AA China $18,118,575,757 
DANGOTE CEMENT Nigeria $14,535,304,519 
BAOSHAN IRON China $14,126,778,114 
ANHUI CONCH-H China $14,038,866,434 
PCHEM Malaysia $13,512,070,093 
NUCOR United States $12,813,869,056 
VULCAN MATERIALS United States $12,647,345,152 
TRANSFAR-A China $11,826,055,455 
Industrials* 
CKH HOLDINGS Hong Kong $52,092,536,096 
CITIC Hong Kong $51,498,483,186 
CRRC CORP LTD China $50,796,939,479 
GENERAL DYNAMICS United States $42,991,931,392 
CHINA RAIL GR-H China $34,567,913,024 
CHINA STATE-A China $29,317,918,923 
CHINA COM CONS-H China $28,806,707,833 
CHINA SHIPBUIL-A China $26,604,955,896 
CHINA RAIL CN-H China $26,476,497,763 
SH INTL PORT China $23,146,882,664 
RYANAIR HOLDINGS Ireland $20,800,197,851 
 
* Shows companies valued over $20 billion USD only. 
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4.3.1 Correlations between market capitalization and emissions 
A commonality found among the four sectors (Figure 4.1) is the clustering of points near low 
market capitalization and low Scope 1M emissions, followed by a dispersal of data points with 
increasing market capitalization and Scope 1M emissions. A linear relationship cannot be 
visually inferred from any of the sectors, but a weakly positive monotonic relationship in each is 
plausible. The Utilities sector (Figure 4.1a) appears to have the greatest dispersal of data points 
and the least discernable pattern, while the data points in the Energy sector (Figure 4.1c) show a 
more confined pattern.  
The results of calculating two correlation coefficients, Spearman’s rho (U) and Kendall’s tau (W), 
confirm positive monotonicity in the data in all four sectors (Table 4.3) Spearman’s U indicates a 
strong correlation between market capitalization and Scope 1M emissions in the Energy sector, 
Figure 4.1 Market capitalization (billions USD) vs. Scope 1M emissions of companies in the Utilities (a), Materials (b), 
Energy (c), and Industrials (d) sectors in 2015 
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followed by the Utilities and Materials sectors with moderate correlations, and the Industrials 
sector with a weak correlation. All correlations were found to be statistically significant 
(p<0.05).  
The Kendall W coefficients follow a similar order of correlation strengths to those results of the 
Spearman U coefficients: the Industrials sector has the weakest correlation, and the Energy sector 
has the strongest correlation. However, the W < U for each sector and thus the correlations 
calculated using W indicate overall weaker correlations than those interpreted from the Spearman 










Coefficient (W)  
Utilities 1.87E-13 0.5189815 1.45E-12 0.3603402 
Materials 2.20E-16 0.5110109 2.20E-16 0.3652102 
Energy 2.20E-16 0.7411598 2.20E-16 0.5401918 
Industrials 2.20E-16 0.3924914 2.20E-16 0.270871 
 
Table 4.3: Spearman Rank and Kendall Tau testing results for market capitalization vs. emissions 
 
Due to the large number of data points, it is difficult to discern patterns, especially at the 
clustering occurring at the lower end of the Scope 1M emissions and market capitalization ranges 
(Figure 4.1) To better discern the data in this area, I have presented the same plots as in Figure 
4.1, but magnified to display the data at these lower ranges (Figure 4.2). The results show even 
greater dispersal of data points in all four sectors. A positive monotonic pattern becomes even 
less discernable for the Utilities, Materials, and Industrials sector, while the Energy sector holds 
some of this pattern.  
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Figure 4.2: Low-end of market capitalization (billions USD) vs. low-end of Scope 1M emissions of companies in 
the Utilities (a), Materials (b), Energy (c), and Industrials (d) sectors in 2015 
4.3.2 Company reporting in Annex 1 and Non-Annex 1 countries  
Figure 4.3 shows mosaic plots depicting the frequencies of companies either reporting emissions 
(green tiles) or not reporting emissions (blue tiles) in Annex 1 and Non-Annex 1 countries. What 
is immediately evident are the very small proportions of companies reporting Scope 1M 
emissions across sectors. Common among the sectors is that the majority of reporting companies 
are located in Annex 1 countries. However, the majority of non-reporting companies in the 
Industrials, Materials, and Utilities sectors are located in Non-Annex 1 countries. The exception 
is the Energy sector, with the only case of a majority of non-reporting companies located in 
Annex 1 countries. It is important to note, however, that the Energy sector has an overwhelming 
majority of companies located in Annex 1 countries, whereas the split between Annex 1 and 
Non-Annex 1 countries in the other sectors is approximately equal. As a result, we also see a 
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large difference between the number of non-reporting companies in Annex 1 versus Non-Annex 
1 countries in the Energy sector.   
 
 
Figure 4.3: Mosaic plots showing the relationship between the status of emissions reporting and Annex 1 or 




4.4.1 Emissions uncertainty with varied market value at the sectoral level 
Although only conclusions of correlation, not causation, can be made of the relationship between 
market capitalization and Scope 1M emissions, there are notable differences when comparing the 
data between sectors. The higher density of data points in all four plots (Figure 4.1) near the low 
end of the ranges in market capitalization and Scope 1M emissions may indicate that companies 
that have low market value (relative to the range of market values of other companies in their 
associated sectors), are more likely to report lower emissions. This appears more true for the 
Energy sector, than the Utilities, Materials, or Industrials sectors. Furthermore, it appears as 
company market capitalization increases, companies are more likely to differ widely in reported 
emissions. This brings up other important questions regarding the influence of market 
capitalization on reported emissions: Do companies with similar high10 market values encounter 
less limitations to reducing their emissions? And if so, are some companies doing significantly 
more to reduce their emissions than others? It would not be irrational to suppose that some 
companies with the capabilities to mitigate emissions, have simply chosen not to do so 
(Frumhoff et al 2015).  
Though an overall positive relationship may be judged for each sector when considering Figure 
4.1, Figure 4.2 does not easily allow for any statements to be made about the relationships. The 
dispersal of data points in the Utilities, Materials, and Industrials sectors are widespread, and 
while the data points for the Energy sector are also scattered, there is a clearer sustained positive 
monotonic relationship. The uncertainty in the patterns may be attributed to the industry 
classification level chosen for the analysis. Analyzing company data at the sectoral level may be 
too broad to allow for the identification of any patterns. Instead, analysis at lower classification 
levels, such as sub-industry, may provide different results. In lower classifications, greater 
similarities can be found among companies in regards to business activities and structures. For 
example, the Utilities sector includes companies producing electricity using fossil fuels, nuclear, 
and renewable sources. Clearly, the emissions reported by a renewable electricity producer 
 
10 Relative to the market capitalization of other companies in its respective sector.  
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would be conceivably much less than that of a non-renewable electricity producer. This company 
distinctions are made only at the sub-industry level. Therefore, using lower industry 
classifications in the analysis may allow for determining more precise relationships between 
market capitalization and reported emissions. 
The statistical results confirming that relatively weak correlations exist between market 
capitalization and emissions (Table 4.3) could be helped if more companies were reporting their 
emissions, especially those with high market values. Though Spearman’s rank shows stronger 
correlations than those of Kendall’s tau, W is the preferable measurement as it deals with ties 
more appropriately than U (Gilpin 1993). It is otherwise unsurprising that W < U since U is 
typically about 1.5 times larger than W (Gilpin 1993). However, conducting non-parametric 
statistics on distribution-free data remains a less powerful tool than using parametric statistics. 
Spearman’s rank and Kendall’s tau correlations are computed by ranking the data, so inevitably 
some information about the differences between values are lost. To improve the statistical results 
in this thesis, it would thus be of high value in the future to investigate methods for using 
parametric statistics on presently available company emissions data in the future.  
Yet, if the correlation statistics presented in Table 4.3 reflect reality, then it can be estimated that 
companies with large market value, that are not currently reporting, are also emitting at larger 
quantities than those with smaller market value. This reasoning should be further explored in 
future research, with more comprehensive company-level emissions data where possible. 
Moreover, it would be of interest to conduct similar evaluations of the data (i.e. producing scatter 
plots, conducting tests for correlations) on lower GICS industry classifications, such as industry 
group or sub-industry.  
4.4.2 Majority of reporting companies in Annex 1 countries in three sectors 
I chose to use country of domicile as an independent variable because the location of senior 
management is where important corporate decisions are made, including those decisions having 
to do with where business operations, and consequently emissions, will occur (if not already in 
the country of domicile). The location of senior management is important in the context of 
emissions reporting practices, as some countries may be exposed to different reporting practices 
(i.e. whether or not reporting of emissions is a norm or regulation). Furthermore, though 
company emissions are also influenced by the stringency of rules or laws in the countries where 
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the company is operating, the decision to operate in these countries is presumably made in the 
country of domicile.  
A major finding was that out of the four sectors analyzed, three showed an approximately equal 
distribution of companies located in Annex 1 and Non-annex 1 countries: the Utilities, Materials, 
and Industrials sectors (Figure 4.3). This is important because it allows for a more reliable 
analysis of the proportions of companies reporting and not reporting. In these three sectors, the 
majority of reporting companies were located in Annex 1 countries. This finding may shed light 
on the corporate practices and norms present in developed countries versus developing countries. 
If reporting is more common in developed countries, we can infer that businesses are exposed to 
different, perhaps stronger, pressures to account for and disclose emissions information. This 
also highlights the greater acceptance of climate change accountability at the business level in 
developed countries. Though the results do not provide information about mitigation efforts, the 
fact that companies are engaging in emissions disclosure is a sign that there is a recognition of 
their climate change contributions, and is thus a step towards mitigation.  
The Energy sector yields interesting results in that it is the only sector with a majority of 
companies located in Annex 1 countries. Moreover, the majority of these companies in Annex 1 
countries are not reporting emissions. Recalling the definition of the Energy sector (Appendix A: 
Table A.1), this sector includes companies engaged in exploration, production, refining, 
marketing, storage and transportation of fossil fuels. Thus, it is conceivable that operations of a 
company in the Energy sector are likely carried out in more than one country. In fact, Heede 
(2014) found that a substantial amount of emissions embedded in fossil fuels have been extracted 
in Non-Annex 1 countries. In addition, my results show that a majority of companies engaging in 
the extraction of fossil fuels (i.e. those in the Energy sector) have senior management located in 
Annex 1 countries. Though emissions accounting does not take an extraction-based approach as 
Heede (2014) as done, but rather a production-based approach, direct emissions resulting from 
the exploration, extraction, and production of fossil fuels should be accounted for. On the whole, 
these findings question the motives and activities of those Energy companies with senior 
management in Annex 1 countries who are also not reporting their emissions.  
While Heede (2014) argued that Non-Annex 1 countries, which host much of fossil fuel 
production, should carry an obligation to mitigate, I argue that companies that 
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these operations should also carry this obligation. With that, comes the recognition that most of 
these fossil fuel production companies are headquartered in developed countries.  
The emissions reporting practices of the Energy sector are controlled primarily by companies in 
developed nations, and I encourage further analyses of the peculiarities of this sector’s 





We are at a time when climate change action is essential, and focusing and debating for too long 
on where to place blame may thwart mitigation itself. What is clear is that GHG emissions are a 
direct cause of anthropogenic climate change, and there is an immediate need to decrease these 
emissions. I have shown that past efforts to identify climate change contributors, discuss 
responsibility, and allocate mitigation efforts have largely focused on nations as the relevant 
actors. In an effort to open conversations on an alternative, but also relevant, actor in climate 
change, I have identified the business world as a dominant contributor of direct GHG emissions. 
Businesses must be included in future discussions and research on climate change mitigation. 
They must be held accountable by way of not only committing to transparency and accounting of 
emissions, but also carrying out emissions reductions. Though accepting a sense of responsibility 
for their contributions to climate change is a constructive step, remaining accountable is even 
more essential. This is why I have attempted, in this research, to align global climate targets with 
what should be associated business targets.  
Plenty of research has been conducted on the existence and effectiveness of corporate disclosure 
avenues, accounting methods, and management of GHG emissions (Sullivan 2009, Waddock 
2008, Southworth 2009, Andrew and Cortese 2011, Haslam et al 2014), but a straightforward 
application of company emissions data to climate change mitigation research is yet to be carried 
out. I have attempted to fill this void by studying company-level absolute emissions at a global 
scale, and I have incorporated global climate targets into business futures.  
In using this voluntarily disclosed company-level data, I have uncovered interesting results about 
business reporting patterns and about reported emissions quantities themselves. An alarming 
finding was the overall low rate of emissions reporting across the globe, wherein 9 of 11 sectors 
were reporting percentages of under 8%. Recognizing the necessity of accounting for emissions 
in the process of long-term mitigation, it is striking that this condition is not even close to being 
fulfilled. Furthermore, it was remarkable to find that only a few thousand of the world’s public 
companies (7%) already accounted for almost a fifth of global CO2 emissions in 2015. This was 
explained in part by the finding that these companies made up over 50% of global market share, 
indicating that some of the largest companies in the world are responsible for 19% of global 
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emissions. This fifth of global emissions was found to be composed mostly of emissions reported 
from four energy-intensive sectors: Utilities, Materials, Energy, and Industrials.  
I have used established methods for allocating emissions mitigation efforts among nations to 
explain analogous methods that have, or can, be used for businesses and sectors. Using one of 
these methods, the grandfathering approach, I allocated 1.5°C and 2°C global carbon budgets to 
business sectors, which resulted in larger budgets for sectors that reported larger emissions. This 
may present an unfair advantage to certain companies, but I believe that it is the most realistic 
approach strictly in terms of reaching mitigation targets. Though the grandfathering approach has 
been criticized for its lack of ethical considerations (Neumayer 2000, Caney 2009), I have 
pointed to the fact that these arguments were founded in the national context, and not the 
business context. It would, however, be beneficial for future studies to further examine the 
applicability of past ethical or normative arguments against the grandfathering approach in the 
business context. 
I provided three distinct emissions pathways for each sector, and described their different 
implications: a constant and simple mitigation pathway (linear), an initially stringent but 
eventually accommodating pathway (exponential), and an initially accommodating but 
potentially risky pathway for reaching near-zero emissions (logistic). These pathways were more 
constrained when adjusted for a smaller 1.5°C budget, than when adjusted for a larger 2°C 
budget. In the case of the linear pathway, reaching zero emissions according to the 1.5°C budget 
occur 46 years before that of the 2°C budget. This reiterates the importance of urgent and 
rigorous emissions reductions, for any sector, especially if we are aiming to remain below a rise 
of 2°C in global average temperature. The 1.5°C to 2°C budget ranges are meant to show other, 
more climate-ideal business emissions scenarios, rather than simply targeting the highest 
possible emissions in the range. As previously stipulated, these budgets and pathways are 
informative only in so much as they are relevant to the 7% of public companies reporting 
globally. Despite this limitation, the effort to create corporate emissions budgets in line with 
global climate goals, along with the initiative to provide business emissions pathways according 
to voluntarily reported data, has not been attempted in the literature.  
I have supported my findings with considerations of other factors that potentially influence 
company emissions, and emissions disclosure. I explored the associations between emissions and 
company size, to find that there were overall weak positive correlations between market 
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capitalization and reported emissions. It is somewhat unsurprising that the larger a company’s 
value is, the greater it’s emissions may be. However, more clear correlations might be found with 
analysis of company data at lower industry classifications. Emissions data from more companies, 
as well as higher quality data, would also help to produce more confident conclusions.  
I also investigated the potential impact of company location on reported emissions. Non-
reporting companies were located predominantly in developing countries (Non-Annex 1), 
suggesting that reporting norms or pressures may be different than those in developed countries. 
The exception of the Energy sector also suggests that analyses at lower industry classifications 
may be helpful for discerning clearer associations between company location and reporting. 
Other research avenues may also include investigating the effects of other variables representing 
company size and location, or other variables altogether.  
The approach I took to allocating carbon budgets and providing future mitigation pathways to 
sectors is applicable down to the company level. The sectoral level analyses are insightful, but in 
reality, would be most beneficial if company emissions reporting was: 1) widespread, and 2) 
verified for reliability. Unfortunately, governments are unlikely to demand emissions reporting, 
nor impose auditing measures for accounting, which could otherwise assure that emissions 
reporting becomes widespread and reliable. This is why corporate voluntary disclosure, as our 
only choice of source information on company-level emissions, must be improved upon. 
Overall, I hope that my research has called attention to the role of business in contributing to 
climate change, as well as the importance of business accountability. This work highlighted the 
need for corporate transparency in the form of emissions accounting and disclosure. The capacity 
to account for and disclose environmental information on a yearly basis appears minimal when 
compared to the long-term planning required to implement mitigation initiatives. It comes down 
to a simple deduction: that without proper emissions accounting, there can be no effective and 
long-lasting mitigation. Accordingly, it also stressed the need for mitigation commitments 
specifically associated with greater global climate targets – targets that must trickle down further 
than the organizational boundaries of national governments if we are to expect effective and 
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Table A.1: GICS Sector definitions (MSCI Inc. 2017) 
Sector Definition  
Energy 
Comprises companies engaged in exploration and production, refining and marketing, 
and storage and transportation of oil and gas and coal and consumable fuels. It also 
includes companies that offer oil and gas equipment and services. 
Materials 
Includes companies that manufacture chemicals, construction materials, glass, paper, 
forest products and related packaging products, and metals, minerals and mining 
companies, including producers of steel.  
Industrials 
Includes manufacturers and distributors of capital goods such as aerospace and defense, 
building products, electrical equipment and machinery and companies that offer 
construction and engineering services. It also includes providers of commercial and 
professional services including printing, environmental and facilities services, office 
services and supplies, security and alarm services, human resource and employment 




Encompasses those businesses that tend to be the most sensitive to economic cycles. Its 
manufacturing segment includes automotive, household durable goods, leisure 
equipment and textiles and apparel. The services segment includes hotels, restaurants 
and other leisure facilities, media production and services, and consumer retailing and 
services. 
Consumer Staples 
Comprises companies whose businesses are less sensitive to economic cycles. It includes 
manufacturers and distributors of food, beverages and tobacco and producers of non-
durable household goods and personal products. It also includes food and drug retailing 
companies as well as hypermarkets and consumer super centers. 
Health Care 
Includes health care providers and services, companies that manufacture and distribute 
health care equipment and supplies and health care technology companies. It also 
includes companies involved in the research, development, production and marketing of 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology products. 
Financials 
Contains companies involved in banking, thrifts and mortgage finance, specialized 
finance, consumer finance, asset management and custody banks, investment banking 
and brokerage and insurance. This Sector also includes real estate companies and REITs. 
Information 
Technology 
Comprises companies that offer software and information technology services, 
manufacturers and distributors of technology hardware and equipment such as 
communications equipment, cellular phones, computers and peripherals, electronic 
equipment and related instruments and semiconductors. 
Telecommunication 
Services 
Contains companies that provide communications services primarily through a fixed-line, 
cellular or wireless, high bandwidth and/or fiber optic cable network. 
Utilities 
Comprises utility companies such as electric, gas and water utilities. It also includes 
independent power producers and energy traders and companies that engage in 
generation and distribution of electricity using renewable sources. 
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Table A.2: Definitions for emissions variables, sourced from The Terminal (Bloomberg L.P. 2016) 
Emissions Variable Definition  
Scope 1 Activity 
Emissions Globally 
Scope 1 Activity Emissions Globally Total global amount of scope 1 emissions emitted 
by the company, measured in millions of metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent 
(mtCO2e). Scope 1 emissions are direct GHG (greenhouse gas) emissions from sources 
that are owned or operated by the company. Sources include combustion facilities, 
company owned or operated transportation, and physical or chemical processes. This 
field is sourced directly from the company's response to the Carbon Disclosure 
Project (CDP) questionnaire. 
Scope 1/Direct GHG 
Emissions 
Scope 1/Direct Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions of the company, in thousands of 
metric tons. GHG are defined as those gases which contribute to the trapping of heat 
in the Earth's atmosphere and they include Carbon Dioxide (CO2), Methane, and 
Nitrous Oxide. Scope 1 Emissions are those emitted from sources that are owned or 
controlled by the reporting entity. Examples of Direct Emissions include emissions 
from combustion in owned or controlled boilers, furnaces, vehicles, emissions from 
chemical production in owned or controlled process equipment. Emissions reported 
as CO2 only will NOT be captured in this field. Emissions reported as generic GHG 
emissions or CO2- equivalents (CO2e) will be captured in this field. Field is part of the 
Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) group of fields. 
Direct CO2 Emissions 
Direct Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emissions of the company, in thousands of metric tons. 
Direct Emissions are those emitted from sources that are owned or controlled by the 
reporting entity. Examples of Direct Emissions include emissions from combustion in 
owned or controlled boilers, furnaces, vehicles, and emissions from chemical 
production in owned or controlled process equipment. Emissions expressed as 
generic Greenhouse Gas emissions or CO2-equivalents (CO2e) will not be captured in 
















Scope 1B (Bloomberg) No W = 0.2254, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 76.5056, p-value < 2.2e-16 V = 9903                
p-value  
= 0.1330 Scope 1C (CDP) 
No 
W = 0.2637, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 86.7312, p-value < 2.2e-16 
Consumer Staples Scope 1B (Bloomberg) 
No W = 0.5243, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 22.5787, p-value < 2.2e-16 V = 2609              p-value 
 = 0.1864 Scope 1C (CDP) No W = 0.3867, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 31.8747, p-value < 2.2e-16 
Energy Scope 1B (Bloomberg) 
No 
W = 0.5773, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 17.6846, p-value < 2.2e-16 
V = 2210              
p-value 
= 0.6447 Scope 1C (CDP) No W = 0.4799, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 24.2478, p-value < 2.2e-16 
Financials Scope 1B (Bloomberg) 
No 
W = 0.0604, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 83.145, p-value < 2.2e-16 
V = 8223              
p-value 
= 0.8093 Scope 1C (CDP) No W = 0.0458, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 117.2326, p-value < 2.2e-16 
Health Care Scope 1B (Bloomberg) 
No 
W = 0.3172, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 18.5646, p-value < 2.2e-16 
V = 974              
p-value 
= 0.9888 Scope 1C (CDP) No W = 0.3249, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 24.1521, p-value < 2.2e-16 
Industrials Scope 1B (Bloomberg) 
No 
W = 0.3534, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 89.6163, p-value < 2.2e-16 
V = 15972.5          
p-value 
= 0.8037 Scope 1C (CDP) No W = 0.3388, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 121.8799, p-value < 2.2e-16 
Information Technology Scope 1B (Bloomberg) 
No 
W = 0.076, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 75.3568, p-value < 2.2e-16 V = 6262              p-value 
= 0.2611 Scope 1C (CDP) 
No 
W = 0.0481, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 91.9876, p-value < 2.2e-16 
Materials Scope 1B (Bloomberg) 
No 
W = 0.3039, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 61.8195, p-value < 2.2e-16 
V = 7772              
p-value  
= 0.2261 Scope 1C (CDP) No W = 0.3791, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 59.3748, p-value < 2.2e-16 
Real Estate Scope 1B (Bloomberg) 
No 
W = 0.0901, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 37.3995, p-value < 2.2e-16 
V = 1068              
p-value 
= 0.6838 Scope 1C (CDP) No W = 0.0927, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 35.9819, p-value < 2.2e-16 
Telecommunication 
Services 
Scope 1B (Bloomberg) 
No 
W = 0.5357, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 9.6061, p-value < 2.2e-16 
V = 548                
p-value  
= 0.5437 Scope 1C (CDP) No W = 0.2557, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 15.6509, p-value < 2.2e-16 
Utilities Scope 1B (Bloomberg) 
No W = 0.5899, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 17.3683, p-value < 2.2e-16 V = 1737               p-value  
= 0.4551 Scope 1C (CDP) No W = 0.6374, p-value < 2.2e-16 A = 18.3892, p-value < 2.2e-16 
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Table A.4: Sector and Industry Group statistics: number of companies, Scope 1M Emissions, estimated CO2 
proportions, and CO2-only estimates 













Energy 2125 1469.79 0.878 1289.93 
  Energy 2125 1469.79 0.878 1289.93 
Materials 6015 2098.09 0.891 1869.91 
  Materials 6015 2098.09 0.891 1869.91 
Industrials 7523 804.85 0.925 745.49 
  Capital Goods 5252 150.09 0.889 133.37 
  Commercial & Professional Services 1242 67.84 0.954 64.69 
  Transportation 1029 586.92 0.933 547.43 
Consumer 
Discretionary   7052 104.64 0.945 101.60 
  Automobiles & Components 869 46.43 0.979 45.46 
  Consumer Durables & Apparel 2272 7.87 0.927 7.30 
  Consumer Services 1491 43.46 0.985 42.80 
  Media 1066 1.67 0.994 1.66 
  Retailing 1354 5.23 0.840 4.39 
Consumer 
Staples   2920 118.16 0.843 100.12 
  Food & Staples Retailing 405 30.23 0.753 22.77 
  Food, Beverage & Tobacco 2108 75.42 0.876 66.08 
  Household & Personal Products 407 12.51 0.901 11.26 
Health Care 3263 18.24 0.793 14.05 
  Health Care Equipment & Services 1317 2.33 0.822 1.91 
  
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & 
Life Sciences 1946 15.91 0.763 12.14 
Financials 4989 35.20 0.862 29.95 
  Banks 1785 20.46 0.872 17.84 
  Diversified Financials 2547 13.20 0.813 10.73 
  Insurance 657 1.54 0.900 1.39 
Information 
Technology   5883 178.81 0.816 145.10 
  Software & Services 2739 2.30 0.861 1.98 
  Technology Hardware & Equipment 2329 136.60 0.825 112.75 
  
Semiconductors & Semiconductor 
Equipment 815 39.91 0.761 30.37 
Telecommunic
-ation Services   420 12.08 0.917 11.08 
  Telecommunication Services 420 12.08 0.917 11.08 
Utilities 936 2967.05 0.862 2557.41 
  Utilities 936 2967.05 0.862 2557.41 
Real Estate 2630 21.48 0.754 16.20 
  Real Estate 2630 21.48 0.754 16.20 
Sector Total   43756 7828.40 0.873 6880.84 
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(MtCO2) Linear pathway f(t) 
Exponential  
pathway f(t) Logistic Pathway f(t) 
2°C Scenario 
Consumer Discretionary 3905 -102/77t+102 102(0.97)t  102/(1+0.023e
0.1t)  
Consumer Staples 3848 -100/77t+100 100(0.97)
t 100/(1+0.023e0.1t)  
Energy 49572 -1290/77t+1290 1290(0.97)
t 1290/(1+0.023e0.1t)  
Financials 1151 -30/77t+30 30(0.97)
t 30/(1+0.023e0.1t)  
Healthcare 540 -14/77t+14 14(0.97)
t 14/(1+0.023e0.1t)  
Industrials 28649 -745/77t+745 745(0.97)
t 745/(1+0.023e0.1t)  
Information Technology 5576 -145/77t+145 145(0.97)
t 145/(1+0.023e0.1t)  
Materials 71860 -1870/77t+1870 1870(0.97)
t 1870/(1+0.023e0.1t)  
Real Estate 622 -16/77t+16 16(0.97)
t 16/(1+0.023e0.1t)  
Telecommunication 
Services 426 -11/77t+11 
11(0.97)t 11/(1+0.023e0.1t)  
Utilities 98281 -2557/77t+2557 2557(0.97)
t 2557/(1+0.023e0.1t)  
1.5°C Scenario 
Consumer Discretionary 1490 -102/31t+102  102(0.934)t  102/(1+0.031e
0.24t) 
Consumer Staples 1468 -100/31t+100  100(0.934)
t  100/(1+0.031e0.24t) 
Energy 18916 -1290/31t+1290  1290(0.934)
t  1290/(1+0.031e0.24t) 
Financials 439 -30/31t+30  30(0.934)
t  30/(1+0.031e0.24t) 
Healthcare 206 -14/31t+14  14(0.934)
t  14/(1+0.031e0.24t) 
Industrials 10932 -745/31t+745  745(0.934)
t  745/(1+0.031e0.24t) 
Information Technology 2128 -145/31t+145  145(0.934)
t  145/(1+0.031e0.24t) 
Materials 27421 -1870/31t+1870  1870(0.934)
t  1870/(1+0.031e0.24t) 
Real Estate 237 -16/31t+16  16(0.934)
t  16/(1+0.031e0.24t) 
Telecommunication 
Services 162 -11/31t+11  
11(0.934)t  11/(1+0.031e0.24t) 
Utilities 37503 -2557/31t+2557  2557(0.934)
t  2557/(1+0.031e0.24t)  
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APPENDIX B  
EQUATIONS 
For calculating percentage differences between reported Scope 1M emissions and CO2-only 
estimates I used Equation B.1: 
 % 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 =
𝑀𝐸𝑆 – 𝐶𝐸𝑆
(𝑀𝐸𝑆 – 𝐶𝐸𝑆) 2⁄
 ×  100% (B.1) 
where 𝑀𝐸𝑆 is the total Scope 1M emissions in a sector, and 𝐶𝐸𝑆 is the CO2-only emissions 
estimate in a sector.  
 








𝑘 must be prescribed in order to determine B, and thus find a suitable equation to represent the 
logistic pathway. As indicated by Goshu and Koya (2013), the inflection point, a, is at the point 
where 𝑓′′(𝑡) < 0 and 𝑓′′(𝑡) > 0 on either side of the point. Goshu and Koya (2013) showed 
that, 






𝑓(𝑎) = 𝐴/2 
 
(B.3) 












Recall that 𝑓(𝑡) is presented in MtCO2/year and represents an annual rate of emissions, while 
𝑓′(𝑡) is MtCO2/year2, and represents the change in the rate of annual emissions. As the inflection 
point is defined as the point of maximum growth/decay of the function, 𝑓′(𝑎)
𝑓(𝑎)
 will thus give a 
maximum proportion of the rate of change (annual emissions) of the function. This can be 
translated to a percentage change in annual emissions. To demonstrate the use of Equation B.4, I 
will provide the example of a prescribing a maximum percentage decrease in emissions [at the 











and solving for k in Equation B.5 gives us 0.1.  
For the 2°C budget, the logistic pathways for all sectors were prescribed a maximum percentage 
decrease in emissions to be 5%, while for the 1.5°C budget, the prescribed amount was 12% 
(resulting in a k value of 0.24). As the 2°C budget is larger, the prescribed maximum percentage 
decrease in emissions is much lower than that of the 1.5°C budget. Though presented in a 
broader context of emissions mitigation going beyond just businesses, reduction rates above 5% 
already appear to be considered high, and are accompanied by fundamental and rapid structural 
changes (Riahi et al 2015). A reduction of 12% in one year, I deduct, would be nearly 
unattainable without major infrastructural changes. Yet, the constricting budget of the 1.5°C 







SECTORAL EMISSIONS PATHWAYS 










































   
   






   
              
